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Abstract: 
In Germany a public discussion on the “power of banks” has been going on for decades now 
with the term "power" having at least two meanings. On the one hand, it denotes the power of 
banks to control public corporations through direct shareholdings or the exercise of proxy 
votes – this is the power of banks in corporate control. On the other hand, the  market power 
derived from imperfect competition in markets for financial services is implied, which banks 
exercise vis-à-vis their loan and deposit customers. In the past, bank regulation has often been 
blamed for undermining competition and the functioning of market forces in the financial 
industry for the sake of soundness and the stability of financial services firms. This chapter 
tries to shed some light on the historical development and current state of bank regulation in 
Germany. In so doing, it tries to embed the analysis of bank regulation in a more general in-
dustrial organization framework. For every regulated industry, competition and regulation are 
deeply interrelated as most regulatory institutions, even if they do not explicitly address the 
competitiveness of the market,  affect either market structure or conduct. This paper aims to 
uncover some of the specific relationships between monetary policy, government intervention 
and bank regulation on the one hand and bank market structure and economic performance on 
the other. We hope thereby to be able to point the way to several areas for fruitful research in 
the future. While our focus is on Germany, some of the questions that we raise and some of 
our insights might also be applicable to banking systems elsewhere. 
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1. German banking – stability and market power 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
According to a widely held view, German banking in the past has been stable but not very 
competitive.
1 Although there have been difficulties with single banking institutions – 
Bankhaus Herstadt and Schröder, Münchmeyer & Hengst are well-known examples - no 
widespread systemic crisis has occurred for decades. It is only very recently that word of a 
“banking crisis” has spread over Germany, a phenomenon which we will be discussing in 
more detail below.
2 Between the end of World War II and early 2002, however, the banking 
industry seemed to operate smoothly. Many observers believe that the second characteristic, 
i.e. the lack of competitive pressure in Germany’s financial system, was nothing less than the 
flip side of this medal. Bank regulation in Germany – so the argument goes – had achieved its 
stability goal mainly by restricting competition in the financial services sector and by 
sheltering Germany’s universal banks from competition with foreign banks and non-bank 
suppliers of financial services. Furthermore, regulators and politicians were believed to have 
fostered cartelization of the industry and to have favored national champions. Like in other 
European countries, regulatory capture seemed to be a widespread phenomenon in the past. 
 
In Germany a public discussion on the “power of banks” has been going on for decades now 
with the term "power" having at least two meanings. On the one hand, it denotes the power of 
banks to control public corporations through direct shareholdings or the exercise of proxy 
votes – this is the power of banks in corporate control. On the other hand, the market power 
derived from imperfect competition in markets for financial services is implied, which banks 
exercise vis-à-vis their loan and deposit customers.
3 
 
Given such a strong public perception inside and outside Germany, it is not surprising that the 
regulatory regime in Germany is most often interpreted as an attempt to trade off the 
stabilizing effects of bank market power against the efficiency benefits of more intense 
                                                            
1 See Saunders/Walter (1994), Allen/Gale (2000), Rajan (1996), Gual/Neven (1993), or Beck (2000) for such 
evaluations! 
 
2 We will refer to this point in section 3. below. At the time of writing in spring 2003, the “German banking 
crisis” still remains in a somewhat unresolved state. While no serious banking failures have occurred to date, 
accelerating default rates among non-bank enterprises and a weak outlook for the German economy still raise 
fears that the danger of a systemic disruption of the banking system is not yet fully averted. 
 
3 Interestingly, in the political arena, most attempts to restrict bank powers in Germany in the past were aimed at 
restricting their dominance in corporate control. 
  
 
2
competition in financial services.
4 According to this view, bank regulators have used means of 
anti-competitive regulation to make banking a “safe haven” i.e. not vulnerable to excessive 
risk taking. More recently however, important measures towards deregulation of the banking 
industry were taken at the European level. Anti-competition regulations have been abolished 
and the remaining regulatory structure does more to directly address the primary goal of bank 
regulation, that is a reduction of risk of bank failures. As a consequence of deregulation, there 
is little doubt among industry observers that banking all over Europe, and in Germany as well, 
has become significantly more competitive.
5  
 
Although we find this overall assessment of the past and present of bank regulation in 
Germany convincing, we believe that there is more to the story. While deregulation in 
financial services has been greatly applauded by many economists and the public since its 
beginning in the mid-1980s, for some skeptics the joint occurrence of unfettered competition 
in banking on the one hand and crisis-type phenomena observed around the world on the 
other, is more than just a coincidence. Furthermore, from our perspective, several of the more 
important questions have remained largely unanswered. Why have regulators’ attitudes 
towards competition in financial services changed so dramatically? Will deregulation keep its 
promises? What will the long-term competitive effects of internationally harmonized 
prudential regulations (capital requirements, market discipline, supervision) be in national 
markets that have taken such different roads in the past? While cross-country empirical work 
has made significant contributions to recent research in this area, we believe that evaluations 
of the historical performance of single country banking systems are at least as important.   
 
This chapter therefore tries to shed some light on the development and current state of bank 
regulation in Germany.
6 In so doing, it tries to embed the analysis of bank regulation in a 
more general industrial organization framework. For every regulated industry, competition 
and regulation are deeply interrelated since most regulatory institutions, even if they do not 
explicitly address the competitiveness of the market, either affect market structure or 
conduct.
7 Moreover, discussions on bank regulation, instead of referring to single regulatory 
institutions, might more usefully be directed towards what has recently been termed the 
                                                            
4 As an example see Franke‘s (2000) assessment. 
 
5 In addition, advances in information technology and applied finance have had a strong impact on competitive 
conduct in financial services. 
 
6 Our focus, however, is on regulations pertaining to commercial banking activities and as such only provides a 
discussion on selected aspects of the regulation of universal banks. 
 
7  See Vives (1991) or Cerasi et al. (1998).  
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regulatory regime. In addition to analyzing the traditional instruments of bank regulation 
(capital requirements or deposit insurance), according to Llewellyn (2001) a regulatory 
regime perspective also takes the role of market discipline and banks’ internal corporate 
governance arrangements into account. Therefore, throughout this chapter, a recurring theme 
will be specific types of governance structures that dominate in German banks and the role of 
the public banking sector in Germany in particular. We believe that the importance of these 
structural features of the banking system can hardly be overestimated. For instance, we will 
argue that “government ownership of banks” might mean different things in different 
countries and we will point to several peculiarities of the German case.
8 While our approach 
is mainly descriptive we also try to uncover some of the specific relationships between 
monetary policy, government interference and bank regulation on the one hand and bank 
market structure and economic performance on the other. We hope thereby to be able to point 
to several areas for fruitful research in the future. While our focus is on Germany, some of the 
questions that we raise and some of our answers might also be applicable to banking systems 
elsewhere.  
 
To emphasize the relevance of our perspective, in section 1.2 we first briefly review different 
approaches to interpreting anti-competitive regulation in financial markets. Whether standard 
theory provides useful guidelines for explaining the causes and consequences of bank 
regulation in Germany, will then be discussed. In order to allow a first assessment, in section 
1.3 we take a birds’ eye’s view of the history of bank regulation in Germany,outlining how it 
has evolved since its beginnings in the 1930s. This discussion of the sequence of regulatory 
activities allows us to identify both the fundamental structure of the regulatory regime, and 
the driving forces behind its adjustment over time. Section 1.4 reviews empirical evidence on 
market structure and market power in German banking. We then turn to a more detailed 
evaluation of the interrelationship between regulation on the one hand and competitiveness 
and bank market power on the other. In section 2  our discussion thus focuses on selected 
aspects of bank regulation and bank market structure in Germany and tries to provide data and 
empirical evidence whenever available. Based on our results, section 3 concludes and 
discusses what might be expected for the future. 
 
1.2 Public interventions in financial services – the public and the private interest 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
8 Given the importance of government ownership of banks around the world, every discussion about public 
regulation of banking should take public banking into account as well. See La Porta et al. (2002) for empirical 
evidence on the pervasiveness of government ownership of banks. 
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It is now well recognized that the regulation of banks has important implications for the shape 
and functioning of a financial system and the economy as a whole. While this claim seems to 
be widely accepted among economists, politicians and bank regulators and supervisors, 
international differences in bank regulation indicate that there is much less consensus on how 
it best serves its goals and probably even what these goals are. Yet, what most discussions on 
bank regulation – academic or more policy oriented – have in common, is that they look at 
bank regulation from a “public interest“ perspective. Government intervention serves to cure 
market failures that would otherwise threaten the functioning of the financial system. The 
historical experience with banking crises in many countries strongly underlines the need to 
impose limitations on the discretion of bank owners and managers. Theoretical work has 
pointed to inherent instabilities of the banking business and highlighted the potential for 
severe problems based on asymmetries of information and asset substitution type risk-
shifting.
9 Banks throughout the world are highly leveraged and normally the base of investors 
in their debt instruments, i.e. bank deposits, is widely dispersed. The large share of debt in 
banks‘ capital structures increases the risk of default and as a consequence might trigger 
excessive risk taking in certain economic environments. The wide dispersion of relatively 
small depositors limits the willingness of these debt-holders to act as an effective monitor. 
Furthermore, the social cost of the failure of banking institutions is perceived to be high.
10 All 
these fundamental reasons for regulating banks are well-known and we need not reiterate 
them here in any more detail.
11 Historically, the rationale for bank regulation in Germany is 
also in keeping with these arguments and is primarily aimed at protecting depositors as well 
as safeguarding the viability of banks and the functioning of the financial sector as a whole.
12 
However, from this prudential perspective, it is not immediately clear where a trade-off 
between competition and stability could arise. Why should bank regulators, pursuing the 
public interest (stability of the financial system and protection of depositors), choose to 
restrict competition in banking, thereby laying a well-known burden on society as a whole? 
One explanation that has gained prominence recently may be summarized as follows: bank 
                                                            
9 See Bhattacharya/Boot/Thakor (1998) for an overview. 
 
10 The “shock waves” generated by banking crises often affect the whole economy. See Stiglitz (2001) for a 
discussion.. 
 
11 See Bhattacharya/Boot/Thakor (1998), Dewatripont/Tirole (1994) or Freixas/Rochet (1997) for in-depth 
discussions. 
 
12 It is assumed that the banking business is especially sensitive to depositor confidence. Moreover, bank 
regulation has a strong social impetus as the small depositor is seen as being in need of protection against losses 
caused by bank failures. 
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regulation is best described as taking place in an environment of asymmetric information 
between depositors and banks and is therefore characterized by moral hazard and asset-
substitution type risk-shifting incentives on the part of banks. There is, of course, a long 
history of widespread banking crisis, sustained periods of lack of depositor confidence and 
many examples of outright fraud. One possible and forceful regulatory remedy to these 
problems is to restrict competition in financial services and to create positive bank charter 
values. A franchise value of banks, caused by imperfect competition in banking markets, 
gives bankers something to lose in case of default.
13 The threat of losing a valuable charter 
whenever a bank is closed by regulators makes bankers more conservative and deters 
excessive risk taking. Recent regulatory reforms, by putting more emphasis on safety and 
soundness of banks and abolishing anti-competition regulations, might therefore be based on 
the implicit assumption that the informational gap between financial markets, bank depositors 
and bank regulators on the one hand and bank managers and owners on the other has become 
narrower over the last two decades. 
 
A less naive alternative to the public interest view is the capture theory or “private interest 
view” that interprets regulation as the attempt by a well-organized regulated industry to use 
the sovereign power of the state to capture rents at the expense of customers and society as a 
whole.
14 This perspective seemed to have played an important role among industry observers 
and academics in explaining the perceived low degree of competitiveness in European 
banking in the past. In 1991 Xavier Vives predicted “[...] the main effect of integration will 
be to change the focal point of the strategies of banks from collusion and regulatory capture 
to competition”
15. Given that the banking industry seems to have well-organized lobbying 
instruments at its disposal, to what extent was regulation in the past triggered by the industry' s 
desire to deter competition in financial services?  
 
There might also be a different type of regulatory capture in banking, combining two of the 
aspects of public and private interest mentioned above. In the UK, for instance, the 
Cruickshank report suspected that there has been “an informal contract between successive 
governments and banks, designed to deliver public confidence in the banking system. In 
                                                            
13 See the paper by Demsetz et al. (1996) for instance. 
 
14 See Stigler (1971) and for a brief sketch Kroszner/Strahan (1999). 
 
15 See Vives (1991), p. 17. 
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return for cooperating in the delivery of Government objectives, the banking industry escaped 
the rigors of effective competition.” 
16 
 
Finally, a closely related view on regulation might be termed the “grabbing hands view”.
17 
From this perspective neither the public interest nor the regulated industry, but rather 
politicians and state officials drive regulatory actions and interfere with the regulated industry 
in order to extract benefits and pursue their own interests. As Hellwig (2001) points out, the 
banking industry is especially vulnerable to encouraging greediness on the part of politicians. 
Politicians like to exercise control over banks because the banking business provides a unique 
and most direct opportunity to spend money and fund projects that serve the politicians’ own 
purposes. It is worth noting here and for the remainder of this chapter that while we primarily 
address bank regulation our regulatory regime perspective necessarily leads us to consider 
government ownership of banks as well. The interrelationships between regulation and 
government ownership of banks is at least threefold. Firstly, governance and incentive 
structures in government-owned banks are likely to be different from those in privately 
owned, value-maximizing banks that have traditionally been the focal point of almost all 
discussions on bank regulation. Secondly, in a country where a large share of bank assets is 
already under the control of the state, politicians'  attitudes towards regulating banks might be 
different by comparison to a private banking system. For instance, the nationalization of 
single banks or the banking system as a whole has historically been one forceful 
governmental remedy for banking crises and can thus be interpreted as a means of bank 
regulation itself. Thirdly, one has to ask how competition in financial services is affected 
when some banks are state-owned while others are not. 
 
Recent cross-country empirical work by La Porta et al. (2002) analyzes the consequences of 
government ownership of banks and indicates that a higher share of bank assets controlled by 
government negatively correlates with subsequent financial development and subsequent rates 
of growth in GDP. These findings can be interpreted as evidence supporting the capture 
theory of regulation or the “grabbing-hands view” of government intervention in financial 
markets and thus reinforce a commonly held notion: Government involvement in the capital 
allocation process yields inefficient outcomes because it distorts the price system, favors 
corruption and undermines the functioning of the market. 
 
                                                            
16 Cruickshank (2000), p. vii (Executive Summary) 
 
17 This term is adopted from Shleifer/Vishny (1999).  
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At first glance, the structure of the German banking system seems to be especially exposed to 
inefficiencies arising from regulatory capture and politicians’ grabbing hands. A significant 
share of bank assets in Germany is under the control of the state. La Porta et al. (2002) 
measure the share of government ownership in Germany as 51,90% in 1970 and 36,36% in 
1995. Although only based on observing the ten largest banks in the country, these figures 
capture the overall share of public ownership fairly well. At the end of 2001 the share of 
Landesbanks (central giro institutions of the Federal States) in total bank assets in Germany 
was 19,9% and that of municipal savings banks was 15,4%. Adding public mortgage banks, 
public building societies and public special purpose banks, the share of public banks in total 
banking assets is estimated to be somewhat above 40%.
18 While La Porta et al. (2002) use the 
term “government ownership”, we will refer to these institutions as “public banks” in the 
remainder of this chapter.
19 From our perspective, this is more than just a terminological note 
because in Germany all levels of regional authorities own and control banks. While 
municipalities own more than 500 savings banks, almost all German states
20 hold ownership 
stakes in one of the 12 Landesbanks and besides often own state-level development banks. In 
addition, the Federal Government owns Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank (DtA), two large development banks. 
 
Politicians, especially at the municipal and state level thus often seemed in the past to exert 
direct control over bank assets because states and municipalities acted as a guarantors for the 
liabilities of the savings banks and Landesbanks (guarantee obligation or 
Gewährträgerhaftung) and by law were required to ensure the viability of these public 
enterprises (maintenance obligation or Anstaltslast). For example, they had to provide capital 
in the event of a reorganization.
21 State governments use the Landesbanks as their own 
development banks and directly pursue what is officially stated to be the interest of the state 
in terms of regional economic development. The same can be said about public savings banks 
and the influence exerted by politicians at the municipal level. As is well known, in 2002 an 
agreement was reached between the European Commission, the German authorities and the 
                                                            
18 As of year end 2000, five of the ten largest banks and nine out of the fifteen largest banks belong to the public 
sector. In terms of total assets and measured for the ten largest banks the figure comparable to La Porta et al. 
(2002) for 2000 is 33%. 
  
19 Obviously, with “public banks” we are not referring to banks who have issued shares of common stock and 
whose shares are traded on exchanges. 
 
20 Only the state of Rhineland-Palantine does not hold ownership stakes in a Landbank. 
 
21 This is often termed „maintenance obligation“. As public sector banks in trouble are always rescued because 
of the maintenance obligation, the guarantor obligation has never been called for. For further discussion see 
Hackethal (2003). 
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public banking sector to abolish state and municipal guarantees and significantly modify 
obligations to ensure the banking institution’s viability. We will address these more recent 
developments and their likely consequences in section 3 below. 
 
It is important to note, however, that ownership in most public banks is far from monolithic. 
While municipal savings banks are usually owned by groups of municipalities, Landesbanks 
in aggregate are owned by states and the regional associations of municipal savings banks. 
Furthermore, cross-ownership is important among Landesbanks. The process of decision-
making within Landesbanks might as a consequence be characterized by conflicts of interest. 
It is therefore not immediately clear how different interest groups – politicians, public banks’ 
managers, as well as the public banks’ associations at the state or federal level - contribute to 
what could be termed the corporate governance of German public banks. Also, in addition to 
the “grabbing hands” hypothesis on public interference in banking, there is a competing view, 
termed the “development view” by La Porta et al. (2002). Based on the notion that financial 
markets are characterized by important market imperfections and given that financial 
development is beneficial in that it fosters economic growth, governments might also have a 
positive role to play. From a theoretical point of view, it cannot be entirely ruled out that 
public banks would be better able to provide financial services to certain groups of customers 
when market imperfections are significant. Moreover, private shareholder value-maximizing 
banks in such a market environment might be forced to focus their supply of financial services 
on the least risky and most profitable customers, leaving others “unbanked”. Thus it is the 
case thatsavings banks and state owned Landesbanks have a disproportionately larger market 
share in financing small, young and risky corporate customers.
22  
 
Whether the “grabbing hands” view or the “development view” does a better job in explaining 
the history of public banks in Germany and whether the results of La Porta et al. (2002) also 
apply in the German case remains an open question and more research is definitely required. 
Did the existence of such a large public banking sector cause capital to be allocated 
inefficiently and as a consequence lead to lower economic growth?
 23 As we are primarily 
interested in regulation we also have to ask whether inefficient public banks lead regulators 
                                                            
22  Municipal savings banks for instance do grant 64% of all loans to small craftsmen and provide around 50% of 
financing to newly created enterprises. 
 
23 Two questions are of importance here. (1) Does corporate control exercised by politicians lead to the 
inefficient allocation of capital? And more fundamentally, (2) does the governance structure of public banking 
institutions by its very nature lead to inefficient outcomes? 
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and policymakers to restrict competitive pressure in order to allow these institutions a “quiet 
life”. 
 
Answers to all the questions raised in this section are far from being straightforward, but we 
will try to discuss them in more detail in section 2 when we assess single regulatory 
instruments. It is important to note, however, that from the researcher’s perspective it is 
inherently difficult to analyze how a given regulation affects industry profits
24 and even more 
so, to find out how different interest groups contribute to the regulatory process. 
Unfortunately once again, empirical work on this issue is virtually non-existent in Germany.
25 
In what follows, we therefore first briefly review the history of bank regulation in Germany. 
Our aim is to sketch the fundamental structure of the regulatory regime as well as the driving 
forces behind its adjustment over time. 
 
1.3 Regulation in German banking – a short historical overview 
 
The beginning of banking regulation in Germany dates back to 1931, when licensing 
requirements and bank supervision were first introduced on a general scale and a supervisory 
authority was set up. Before that, only public sector savings banks and mortgage banks had 
been subject to regulation and supervision. Like in many other countries, bank regulation in 
Germany can be interpreted primarily as a response to banking crises. The 1931 initiatives, 
for example, followed the general banking crisis culminating in the default of the Danatbank. 
As a further response and in an attempt to consolidate the provisions passed so far, the first 
German banking law was enacted in 1934.  
 
It is important to note that when bank regulation began in the 1930s the fundamental structure 
of the German banking system, a mix of private, public and co-operative institutions, was 
already in place. Moreover, all three groups of banks had already established banking 
associations at the national as well as the regional level. 
 
                                                            
24 This task is further complicated by the possibility that certain stakeholders might extract part of these rents.  
 
25 Analyses of the effect of regulation on industry profits often use the event study method, measuring the stock 
price reaction of regulated firms to regulatory announcements. One such study conducted by one of the authors 
will be presented further below in section 2.2. Further, in the US several studies analyse congressional voting 
behavior to indirectly infer interest group influence. See Kroszner/Strahan (1998) as an example for the latter 
group of studies. Unfortunately there is no comparable empirical work for Germany. 
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While in the US or UK, mandatory capital requirements were first implemented in the 1980s, 
regulation of bank capital has a long tradition in Germany .
26 For example, mortgage banks 
were subject to structural norms tied to an institution' s equity capital as early as 1899. The 
German Banking Act of 1934 defined a credit institution' s capital, termed “liable capital”, by 
enumerating respective balance sheet items. Further it made “liable capital” a point of 
reference for specific horizontal as well as vertical structural balance sheet rules. 
Interestingly, the early capital requirements primarily served the purpose of limiting maturity 
mismatch between banks‘ assets and liabilities by requiring banks to hold capital in relation to 
the difference between customer liabilities and liquid assets. Regulators as well as academics 
at that time were well aware of the potential losses that banks could suffer whenever they 
were forced to sell off their illiquid loans. Therefore, instead of requiring banks to hold capital 
in relation to an overall measure of asset risk, two further structural norms of the 1934 
Banking Act limited the amount of lending to single borrowers and an institution’s investment 
in real estate and long-term participating interest to a certain proportion of capital. 
 
Supported by the Nazi government, in 1937 German banks entered into a cartel-like 
agreement on interest rates, fees and advertising. The Central Credit Committee (Zentraler 
Kreditausschuss) was established as a platform for private, co-operative and public banks in 
1936 in order to co-ordinate banks’ business decisions and ceilings on loan and deposit 
interest rates. Although no such cartels have remained in place, today the Central Credit 
Committee still exists and serves as an integrated lobbying platform for all German banking 
associations – co-operative, public and private – as well as a contact to the banking industry 
for regulators and administrative institutions. 
 
After World War II the 1934 Banking Act also formed the basis for bank regulation, which 
was first exercised by the western allies‘ military administration and then passed over to the 
states and their authorities. In a remarkable step in 1958 branching restrictions were abolished 
and banking institutions were free to open branches everywhere in the country without 
passing a public needs test. However because public savings banks are closely tied to their 
municipalities’ market areas and in general do not invade each others'  local markets, the 
economic effect of this deregulation might not have been as significant as comparable 
measures taken by US states during the 1978 to 1992 period.
27 
                                                            
26 See Krümmel (1983) for a short survey of the history of capital regulation. 
 
27 See Berger et al. (1995) and Jayaratne/Strahan (1996) for an evaluation of branching deregulation in the US. 
We will highlight the role and structure of the bank branching network in Germany further below. 
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With the passage of the new German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) in 1961 bank 
supervisory activities were centralized at the federal level and passed over to the newly 
established Federal Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen or 
FBSO in what follows). From its beginning the law required the Bundesbank to be involved 
in the supervisory process.
28 In addition, in every single state there has to be a supervisory 
authority for public savings banks. The FBSO is responsible for supervising banks; it grants 
and revokes banking licenses and supervises the ongoing business activities of banks. The 
FBSO has far reaching rights to obtain information, intervene into management decisions, 
recall bank managers, impose moratoria and close a bank. It is worth emphasizing that in 
Germany there is a supervisory agency which is separate from the central bank but the 
Bundesbank is actively involved in banking supervision and significantly supports the 
FBSO
29. The Bundesbank plays an important role in virtually all areas of banking supervision 
with a special emphasis on activities related to collecting and processing relevant information. 
In particular, it is involved in “the issuing of general rules (such as principles and 
regulations), the process of ongoing supervision, with the exception of (sovereign) individual 
regulatory measures vis-à-vis institutions, prudential audits and, international 
cooperation/coordination in the prudential field”.
30  The Bundesbank also plays an important 
role in crisis management.
31 
One of the main arguments in favor of involving the Bundesbank in the supervisory process 
lies in the informational economies of scope between monetary policy, bank supervision and 
crisis management in particular
32. While the allocation of supervisory duties is relatively 
clear, the question of who actually “makes regulation” in Germany is much harder to answer, 
with the German Parliament, the Ministry of Finance and the supervisory authorities (FBSO 
and the Bundesbank) all being involved. Furthermore and as already mentioned above, the 
role played by the banking industry itself should be critically assessed. 
                                                            
28 An interesting remark concerns the fact that the law was enacted against the will of the states, who instituted 
proceedings against it at the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). In its opinion the Court 
emphasized that bank supervision is an integral part of a central bank’s area of responsibilities. 
 
29 In several European countries  - for instance in Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal or Spain - the 
central bank is the only supervisory agency. 
 
30 See Bundesbank (2000) and the Bundesbank’s (www.bundesbank.de) website for further details. 
 
31 For readers interested in the subject, we have listed several websites on German banking in the Appendix.  The 
Bundesbank’s website address is also listed there. 
 
32 See also Vives (2000). 
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According to the Banking Act, the FBSO is required to draw up principles allowing it to 
assess whether a bank’s liquidity and capital is adequate. From 1961 onwards, therefore, 
German credit institutions were subject to the so-called Principle I that limited a bank’s credit 
risk by requiring them to hold an appropriate amount of capital relative to the sum of risk-
weighted assets. Principles II and III, like their predecessors in the Banking Act of 1934, were 
primarily concerned with maturity mismatch and required assets of certain maturity to be 
related to liabilities of similar maturity. With respect to interest rates, cartel-like agreements 
among banks remained in place until 1965. Although the 1961 Banking Act already formed 
the legal basis for federal interest rate regulations, the FBSO only made use of it during the 
1965 to 1967 period. In 1967 all regulations on interest rates were abolished and since then 
loan and deposit rates have been free to adjust to market conditions.
33 In addition to its 
involvement in the supervisory process, the Bundesbank has always been an important player 
in every decision on financial market regulation and in some instances has protected German 
banks from foreign or non-bank competition. For example, at the end of the 1960s the 
increased desire of foreign entities to issue bonds denominated in DM posed a threat to the 
Bundesbank’s strategy to prevent the DM from becoming an international reserve currency. In 
1968, therefore, the Bundesbank settled an agreement with the German banks – the so called 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” – that only a German bank could act as lead underwriter of DM-
denominated issues of foreign entities. This effectively restricted competition from foreign 
banks.
34 The scope of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was expanded further in 1980 before it 
was abolished in 1985. 
 
The 1961 Banking Act remained largely unchanged until the next significant crisis occurred 
in 1974, when Bankhaus Herstatt collapsed as a consequence of large speculative positions in 
foreign exchange. The Herstatt crisis, which according to Herring/Litan (1995)  had a 
significant effect, despite the small size of the bank, on banks world wide, led to several new 
regulatory initiatives: Firstly, a system of group-specific deposit insurance schemes was 
established. It replaced the rudimentary systems that had existed since 1969. The newly 
created system of deposit insurance schemes was unique in that deposit insurance was and 
still is entirely in the hands of the banking groups (co-operatives, public and private banks) 
                                                            
33 Reserve requirements on bank deposits, however, still drive a wedge between money market rates and bank 
deposit rates. 
 
34 Proceeds from the issues were immediately converted into the issuer' s home currency and transferred to him. 
Bilateral agreements with other central banks further ensured that no DM-bonds were issued outside Germany. 
See Franke (2000) for further details. 
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themselves. We will provide a more detailed analysis of deposit insurance in Germany further 
below. As a further response to the Herstatt crisis, the so called Liquiditätskonsortialbank 
(liquidity bank)was founded in order to assist solvent but illiquid private banks. New 
structural norms, termed Principle Ia, were introduced by the FBSO to tie open positions in 
foreign exchange and precious metals to a bank‘s capital. The 1976 amendment to the 
Banking Act further authorized the FBSO to audit single institutions without special reason 
and defined limits on losses experienced by credit institutions that lead to mandatory closure 
by the FBSO. Finally, in 1974 an expert group was implemented to consult the government 
with respect to fundamental questions of the banking industry.
35 
 
It may, however, be seriously doubted whether any of these reforms directly addressed the 
weaknesses in the supervisory system that the Herstatt crisis had uncovered, namely that of 
timely and accurate information in the hands of the supervisors. This information necessarily 
forms the basis of a functioning early warning system. Whether the supervisory agency’s 
ability to detect problems in single banks has since improved, remains somewhat unclear. 
According to Beck (2001), when  Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer & Hengst nearly failed in 
1983 due to large loan losses, these problems were first discovered by the Association of 
Private Banks (Bundesverband deutscher Banken), not by the FBSO!
36 
 
The third amendment to the Banking Act came into force in 1985 and required capital 
adequacy regulations to be met both by individual institutions as well as on a consolidated 
basis. Prior to 1985 banks were permitted to build up credit pyramids through their 
subsidiaries without adequately adjusting the parent bank‘s capital base. Furthermore and as a 
direct response to the Schröder, Münchmeyer & Hengst case, the limit for lending to a single 
borrowing entity was reduced from 75% to 50% of capital. Principle Ia that tied a bank' s 
exposure in foreign currencies and precious metals to its capital was revised in 1990 to also 
cover price risk from derivatives and interest rate exposures. 
 
Further amendments to the Banking Act primarily served to transpose European Directives 
into German law. The fourth amendment in 1993 implemented the Solvency Ratio and first 
Capital Adequacy Directive and raised the threshold of the reporting requirement for large 
loans from around € 500,000 to € 1,500,000. Since the mid 1930s German banks have been 
                                                            
35 See Krümmel (1980) for a report. 
 
36 Schröder, Münchmeyer & Hengst had lend heavily to building machinery group IBH. See 
Goodhart/Schoenmaker (1993) for a short description.  
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required to report all large loans to a central credit register maintained by the central bank. 
After consolidating these reports, the Bundesbank notifies the lending banks of the overall 
indebtedness of their borrowers. It is interesting to note that the first Basle Accord, underlying 
the Capital Adequacy Directive, was accompanied by heavy discussions with respect to its 
effect on the international competitiveness of German banks.
37 While the competitiveness of 
domestic banks in the international marketplace was still an issue when the so called Basle II 
program was made public in 1999, in Germany discussions on Basle II now focus much more 
attention on questions related to capital requirements, internal rating systems and bank loan 
supply to SMEs. 
 
In 1994 and after six years of intense debate, money market mutual funds were allowed to 
operate in Germany posing a serious competitive threat to German banks'  deposit business. In 
the preceding years the Bundesbank especially had strongly opposed the necessary changes to 
the Investment Company Act because of monetary policy considerations.
38 In section 2 
below, we will use this episode of financial market regulation to clarify further the role of the 
monetary authority in protecting banks deposit franchise. 
 
Another revision of the Banking Act occurred in 1995 and led to changes in the rules on 
consolidation and large-credits. A major innovation was brought about by the sixth 
amendment to the Banking Act in 1998 that implemented three European Directives: the 
Investment Services Directive, the Capital Adequacy Directive, and the so called Post-BCCI 
Directive. As a consequence of the 1998 reform, like in other European Countries, investment 
firms are now supervised according to the same rules as credit institutions. Also the concept 
of the trading book was introduced and Principle I was changed accordingly.
39 Banks are now 
allowed to use their own internal models to assess their risk position with respect to the 
trading book. In 1998 the Directive on Depositor Guarantee and Investor Protection was 
implemented. A statutory system compensating depositors in the event  of bank default was 
established that complements the already existing group specific schemes.
40 In 1999 the 
FBSO changed its internal structure and, among other things, established a new division 
concerned with “complex groups”, that is with large international financial conglomerates. In 
                                                            
37 While the implementation of this directive in 1993 did not materially change Principle I, the question of what 
types of equity capital German authorities would allow to consider as “liable capital” was hotly debated. 
 
38 This point is also emphasized by Saunders/Walter (1994). 
 
39 Tier 3 capital was defined and an institution’s own funds were introduced as an adjustment to its liable capital. 
 
40 A discussion of the private deposit insurance scheme in Germany is provided further below. 
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2002 a major reform in financial market supervision occurred, when a new integrated 
financial services supervising authority was established that comprises the formerly separated 
supervisory offices for banking, insurance and securities trading.
41 Obviously the Ministry of 
Finance has thus made a serious attempt to track the organizational complexity of today’s 
financial services industry. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the most important events in German bank regulation since World War 
II. 
 
<Table 1 around here> 
 
With respect to the fundamental structure of the regulatory regime and the driving forces for 
its adjustments over time, the following is worth emphasizing and will be discussed in more 
depth in section 2:  
 
Banking regulation in Germany, at least since World War II, has rested on two strong pillars: 
licensing and supervision on the one hand and capital requirements on the other. Limits on 
banking activities, portfolio composition or lending activities, ceilings on deposit interest 
rates, or restrictions on bank branching in contrast have either not played a significant role 
from the outset, or were abolished much earlier than in other countries. In some sense these 
observations seem to contradict the notion of particularly anti-competitive bank regulation in 
Germany. Although the regulatory frame was relatively stable until the early 1990s, 
amendments to the Banking Act before 1990 were triggered primarily by problems of single 
institutions. Reforms that were enacted after 1990 in contrast were  motivated in the first 
instance by the necessity to transpose EU directives into German law. With respect to 
identifying key players in the regulatory arena, it is worth noticing that on several occasions 
the Bundesbank prevented the introduction of securitized money market instruments (money 
market funds, DM-denominated CDs) for monetary policy reasons. Furthermore, it effectively 
deterred entry by foreign banks in DM-denominated bond underwriting activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
41 The role of the Bundesbank in banking supervision has formally remained unaltered by this restructuring.   
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1.4 Market structure and conduct: empirical evidence on the competitiveness of German 
banking 
 
In the introduction it was stated that German banking in the past was often considered as 
stable but not very competitive. If assessments of the stability of banking are based on the 
number of failures and the occurrence of systemic banking crises, the notion of the relative 
stability of German banking since World War II cannot easily be rejected. By comparison, the 
empirical evidence on the degree of competition among German banks is somewhat more 
ambiguous.  
 
Market structure and industry concentration in a universal banking system 
 
An important aspect of the German tradition of bank structure and regulation is that regulators  
impose only few restrictions on the range of services banks are allowed to offer to their 
customers. It seems fair to say that Germany is perceived to be the prototype of a universal 
banking system. The most direct tool for regulating the structure of banking and financial 
services, namely the centerpiece of all banking legislation, therefore lies in the definition of 
what constitutes a bank. This definition is crucial as it defines the scope of activities and 
products subject to regulation. And on the other hand, it also implicitly defines a group of 
non-bank suppliers of financial services that remain unregulated or are subject to some other 
form of public intervention.
42 The German Banking Act defines a credit institution as an 
enterprise commercially active in at least one of twelve fields of business, which include 
deposit taking, loan granting, discounting of bills of exchange, investment fund business, 
securities underwriting and the like.
43 Edwards/Fischer (1994) note that "[...] the legal 
definition of banking business is so broad that most financial institutions are, by definition, 
banks“. Only banks’ insurance activities, mortgage banking and activities of building 
societies require legally separate subsidiaries. 
 
However, data compiled by Barth et al. (2001) shows that from 1999 onwards universal 
banking was common in EU countries. One of their indices summarizes information about the 
restrictiveness of bank participation in specific financial services activities (securities, 
insurance and real estate) and about whether banks are allowed to own non-financial firms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
42 See also Barth et al. (2001). 
 
43 Besides, the Banking Act also defines a group of financial services institutions (portfolio management, 
investment trading, own-account trading) and financial enterprises (leasing, consulting (M&A etc.)).  
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An index value of 1 indicates that no restrictions are imposed on banks, whereas a value of 4 
would indicate that all activities in these areas are prohibited.
44 While Germany is among the 
countries with a low index (1.25), the average index value for EU countries is 1.82, which is 
significantly lower than in the rest of the world (1% level of significance).
45 The world wide 
average of the restrictiveness index is 2.5. It is 2.3 for European non-EU countries, 2.9 for 
African countries, 2.5 for American Countries and 2.7 for Asian countries in the Barth et al. 
(2002) dataset. Continental European banking markets in general now seem to be 
characterized by a universal banking approach. However Berger et al. (2001) suspect that the 
Single Market Program (SMP), and the rule of mutual recognition in particular, has made 
universal banking the norm in the EU because remaining restrictions at the national level 
might put domestic banks at a disadvantage.
46 If this notion were true, for some observers 
universal banking might appear as the best practice benchmark and competition would lead to 
strong convergence towards unrestricted bank activities.  
 
Theoretically there seem to be several reasons why universal banks could be more efficient 
than specialized banking institutions that are restricted in the scope of their activities.
47 
Rajan’s (1996) discussion, however, should make us somewhat cautious here: His argument 
points to the relevance of the legal and financial framework within which universal banks are 
allowed to operate. Following his argument, in a financial system that is fairly competitive, 
where a full range of financial services providers are allowed to operate and where there are 
meaningful disclosure requirements as well as political checks and balances and a working 
regulatory framework, universal banking could hardly be harmful to the economy. In such a 
framework competition decides whether universal banking or more specialized financial 
institutions will be the most efficient vehicles for providing firms and households with 
financial services. But in a country where these requirements are not met, the historical 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
44 In computing this index Barth et al. (2001) use detailed information on bank regulation in a large cross-section 
of countries. Barth et al. (2001) proceed as follows. For every country in their dataset they rank the degree of 
restrictiveness imposed on banks when entering a certain line of activity. They consider securities activities, 
insurance, and real estate activities. Further they look for restrictions on the ability of banks to own and control 
firms. For all these activities they assign values ranging from 1 (=unrestricted) to 4 (=prohibited). The indices 
mentioned in the text above are just the average of these ranks. 
 
45 These figures are based on our own computations using the Barth et al. (2001) data base. Access to their data 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
46 Unfortunately they were not able to exactly follow the development of regulations on banks‘ activities in EMU 
countries. A partial sketch of these developments is provided by OECD (1992), pp. 51-54 (Table 4). 
 
47 These range from economies of scope to the more efficient use of customer specific information and finally to 
arguments involving the diversification of business risk. See Rajan (1996) for an overview and Vander Vennet 
(2002) for empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis. 
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predominance of a few large universal banks might have seriously hindered the emergence of 
securities markets, financial innovations, and more specialized suppliers of financial 
services.
48 As yet these idiosyncrasies of universal banking systems are not well understood.
49 
This is especially true for an analysis of the competitive effects of universal banking and its 
likely repercussions in the regulatory framework. Although our ability to analyze questions of 
this type is limited, we will proceed by describing the competitive structure of the German 
universal banking system in order to provide a first step towards a better understanding.  
 
Hackethal (2003) gives a detailed description of the structure of the banking market in 
Germany highlighting the role of private, public and co-operative banks. For a basic 
understanding of this so-called three-pillar system we refer the reader to his contribution to 
this volume, which we take as a starting point for our discussion in the remainder of this 
section. 
 
In light of standard oligopoly theory, measures of market structure and especially indices of 
bank concentration might serve as first indicators for the degree of competitiveness. This is 
exactly why indices of market concentration, for example concentration ratios and the 
Herfindahl index, play such an important role in almost all recent assessments of US and 
European banking markets. They are also widely used in empirical work. Data presented in 
the literature, however, does not draw a clear and reliable picture. For example, figures for the 
3-firm concentration ratio CR3, the combined market share of the three largest institutions, for 
the German banking market range from 89.5% in Allen/Gale (2000) to 27 % in 
Cetorelli/Gambera (2001) and even to a low value of less than 17% in Danthine et al. (1999). 
While a 3-firm concentration ratio of around 90% would lead us to conclude that Germany is 
among the most highly concentrated banking markets in the world, a figure of less than 17% 
would indicate exactly the opposite and make Germany one of the least concentrated banking 
industries world wide. What is the underlying problem in interpreting these measures of 
market concentration? Although this question is almost impossible to answer precisely, as we 
                                                            
48 Market power as well as political power and regulatory capture might be responsible for such a negative effect 
on financial development. See Rajan (1996) and also Barth et al. (2002). Similarly Boot/Thakor (1997) offer 
several reasons why stand-alone banks might be at a disadvantage in universal banking systems that are not 
based on economic efficiency. Obviously questions of this type are of central importance for any assessment of 
the financial system in Germany and its historical performance. See for instance the contribution by Franzke et 
al. (2003) for an in-depth analysis. Although such a discussion goes far beyond the scope of this chapter, it might 
nevertheless provide some guidance for a discussion of bank regulation and competition. Firstly, an assessment 
of the regulatory framework within which universal banks are forced to operate, might turn out to be a useful 
intermediate step towards a better understanding of universal banking. Secondly, it is important to keep in mind 
that “allowing” universal banking need not necessarily lead to actually “observing” universal banking. 
 
49 See also Rajan (1996) for such an assessment. 
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see it, more attention should be devoted to traditional questions related to the delineation of 
the relevant market in terms of geographic reach as well as in terms of the set of relevant 
competitors. For example, it seems to be widely accepted that retail banking markets are local 
in nature.
50 Markets for investment banking services in contrast seem to have grown beyond 
national boundaries and today are perceived to be of almost global dimension. Furthermore, 
while the majority of German banks is active in the retail segment, only a few of them offer 
investment banking services.
51 Most of these retail banks conduct their business in narrowly 
defined regional markets as they belong to either the co-operative or the public banking 
sector. Since these banking institutions do not invade each others'  regional markets, within-
group competition is of only minor importance. Finally, as pointed out by Hackethal (2003) 
competition in German financial services might be described as competition among groups of 
financial conglomerates. Besides the few big banks the co-operative as well as the public 
banking sector could also be viewed as one large competitor that offers almost all types of 
financial services. Whether the group character of competition softens competitive pressure or 
even intensifies it, is an open but extremely important question. 
 
Retail banking 
 
Let us turn to retail markets first. Table 2 contains Herfindahl indices for German 
administrative regions called Landkreise for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000. These regions 
might be a useful approximation for local banking markets relevant to retail banking in 
Germany. Because market share data for banks is generally not available at this level of 
disaggregation, branching data was used instead.
52 MSi,j denotes bank i’s market share in local 
market j. We approximated MSi,j by the number of branches that bank i operates in j divided 
by the total number of bank branches operated in market j. Individual bank market shares in a 
given administrative region were squared and summed. 
 
<Table 2 around here> 
 
                                                            
50 See Amel et al. (2001) or Cruickshank (2001), chapter 5. 
  
51 If the retail market were indeed national in scope and all banks would compete in retail services, then a CR3 
around 12% to 13% would be a reliable estimate for the year 2000. The Herfindahl based on balance sheet total 
would then be around 0.015. See Bundesbank (2001). 
 
52 As Fischer (2001) shows for US Metropolitian Statistical Areas, Herfindahl indices based on branching data 
provide a reasonable approximation of the more common Herfindahl indices based on deposit market shares. 
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Although the figures in table 2 are not directly comparable with data from other countries, 
three conclusions can be drawn
53. Firstly, local banking markets in eastern Germany are much 
more concentrated than their western counterparts. There are structural differences between 
eastern and western markets which might account for the differences in concentration. For 
example during the 1990s per capita income was lower and default rates were higher in the 
eastern part of the country.
54 It might nevertheless be interesting to note that with German 
reunification in 1990 public savings banks and credit-co-operatives were inherited from the 
former German Democratic Republic. Although these institutions had to be reshaped in 
several dimensions, market entry in the sense of opening branches was primarily observed 
with private banks. Secondly and unlike the US, there seems to be no clear-cut rural-urban 
pattern.
55 One reason is the large number of relatively small co-operative banks in rural areas 
which lead to more fragmented market structures. Thirdly, during the 1996 to 2000 period, the 
process of industry consolidation was much more pronounced in rural areas (especially in the 
eastern part of the country), and this might also be seen as a consequence of the fragmented 
structure of co-operative banks in rural areas. As already mentioned above, the retail market is 
quite fragmented as the public and co-operative banks among themselves do not in principle 
invade each others'  regional markets. Table 3 provides an initial basic impression which  
further illustrates the typical structure of a local banking market in Germany. In order to 
enable a  better comparison we took into account all 83 German cities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants. As a sub-sample of all markets considered in table 9, these densely populated city 
areas are relatively homogeneous and might well serve as useful approximations for local 
banking markets. 
 
<Table 3 around here> 
 
On average there are 25 banks present in these local markets. In 63 of the 83 cities considered 
there is only one savings bank present, whereas there are on average 6 co-operative banks and 
17 private banks. This reinforces the widely held notion that the principle of market 
demarcation is almost perfect among the local savings banks. Savings banks are strictly tied 
                                                            
53 Fischer (2001) computes Herfindahl indices based on branching data for 212 Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 
the US. The average Herfindahl for these local US markets is 0,1135 and is thus considerably lower than the 0,2 
for densely populated areas in western Germany. 
 
54 A two-stage game of banking competition comprising an entry stage where banks decide whether to conduct 
deposit and loan business in a certain local market and in the second stage compete in prices or quantities, would 
normally predict that less banks enter whenever borrower default risk is higher or households are less wealthy. 
 
55 In the US, for example, the rural county markets show significantly higher bank concentration than the more 
urban MSA markets. 
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to the local market, which is identical to the jurisdiction of the municipalities that act as their 
guarantors. Market areas of co-operative banks in contrast show much more regional overlap. 
On average 40% of all branches in these local markets are operated by savings banks and 22% 
are operated by co-operative banks. Measured this way, the market share of the four large 
private banks is approximately 21% in these 83 markets. 
 
Looking at local banking markets as the relevant market in retail banking business thus 
reveals that the large private banking institutions,i.e. Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
Hypovereinsbank and Commerzbank, which are often perceived as being the most powerful 
and dominant players in German financial services, are better described as fringe players in 
many local markets (the average share of the branch network in the 83 markets considered 
amounted to 7% for Deutsche Bank, 5% for Dresdner Bank, 5% for Commerzbank and 3% 
for Hypovereinsbank), whereas savings banks and co-operative banks seem to dominate the 
retail market. In all 83 city markets considered, the largest supplier in terms of branch 
networks is the local savings bank. Figure 1 displays average concentration ratios from CR1 
to CR10 for cities with populations above 100,000. On average the local savings bank 
operates 40% of all branches (ranging from 20% to 60% within our sample of densely 
populated cities); the next largest banks all operate considerably smaller branch networks. 
 
<Figure 1 around here>  
 
The important issue here is how these structural aspects affect competition in retail banking. 
In addition to the question of how German banking compares to its European peers, there 
might also be a specific interest in intra-industry studies of concentration and price.
56 Retail 
banking markets are particularly well suited to this type of analysis because there is strong 
evidence – anecdotal as well as analytical – that markets can be separated by location. 
Moreover, studies using data from only one national market might lead to more accurate 
conclusions concerning the influence of market structure on price because omitted variables 
with respect to the legal and regulatory environment are less likely to play a role. As already 
mentioned above, surveys among households and small enterprises in the US conducted by 
the Federal Reserve Board offer convincing evidence that loan and deposit customers shop for 
banking services in rather narrowly defined markets. In most empirical work in the US so-
                                                            
56 In his survey on structure-performance studies Schmalensee (1989) concludes "In cross-section comparisons 
involving markets in the same industry, seller concentration is positively related to the level of price“ and Since 
studies of price have fewer obvious weaknesses than studies of profitability [this] seems to provide the best 
evidence in support of the concentration-collusion hypothesis”, see Schmalensee (1989), p. 988. 
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called metropolitan statistical areas or counties serve to approximate these local markets. 
Studies such as Berger/Hannan (1989), Neuberger/Zimmermann (1990) or Neumark/Sharpe 
(1992) have all found strong evidence in favor of the concentration price relationship at the 
intra-industry level. For Europe to date only a few such studies exist. Fischer (2001) analyzes 
this relationship for local retail banking markets in Germany from 1992 to 1995. Since market 
share data in deposit and loan markets is not available, he computes measures of supplier 
concentration based on branching information. For most bank products considered, the study 
finds a significant concentration price correlation that points to the exercise of market power 
in more concentrated markets. Deposit rates, especially those on time deposits and savings 
deposits, are lower in more concentrated markets (i.e. the margins earned by banks are 
higher). Rates on loans to small firms are significantly higher in these markets. As a further 
illustration, table 4 displays results of concentration-price regressions using data from Fischer 
(2001).
57 Table 4 contains results of pooled regressions for three specific bank products for 
the 1992 to 1995 period using end-of-quarter observations on discount loans to small 
borrowers (with loan volumes below € 50.000), savings deposits and time deposits with 
maturities between one and three month.
58 The dependent variable is the difference between 
the product interest rate and the three-month money market rate (FIBOR).
59 Control variables 
are all observed at the local market level; as in other studies that estimate reduced form price 
equations, the coefficients of most of the control variables are difficult to interpret.
60 
However, confirming empirical results from other countries and in line with standard 
oligopoly theory, the Herfindahl index of local market concentration seems to be positively 
related to gross margins earned by German banks and is significant in two regressions 
(savings deposits and discount loans).
61 
 
<Table 4 around here> 
 
 
 
                                                            
57 The specification used here, however, is somewhat different from Fischer’s (2001). 
 
58 For further results and some other specifications and estimation techniques see Fischer (2001). 
 
59 For the two deposit products the margin is computed as “money market rate minus deposit rate“; the loan 
margin is “loan rate minus money market rate”. 
 
60 See Berger/Hannan (1989), Neuberger/Zimmerman (1990) or Borenstein (1989) for similar problems. 
 
61 Further evidence on the concentration-price relationship in Germany comes from an empirical analysis of the 
price effects of local bank mergers. Mergers that lead to stronger increases in local bank concentration also show 
stronger subsequent price effects to the disadvantage of loan and deposit customers; see Fischer (2001). 
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Investment banking 
 
To derive  comparable structural measures of the market for investment banking services is 
somewhat more difficult. What is the geographic scope of this market? Should, for example, 
in underwriting corporate bonds and equity a global approach be taken and should  these 
issues be considered with respect to European or only to German entities? For the following 
analysis we considered issues involving German entities only, thus allowing a more focused 
interpretation of the results. Table 5 shows Herfindahl indices for banks acting as lead 
underwriter in IPOs in Germany during the 1990 to 2000 period.
62 
 
<Table 5 around here> 
 
As  can be seen from table 5, the market for lead underwriting services was highly 
concentrated at the beginning of the 1990s. Only few IPOs were brought to the market and the 
large German banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank) dominated in equity 
underwriting. Of the Landesbanks, only WestLB had a noticeable market share. During the 
1990s ,however, the development towards strong market fragmentation began.
63 As the IPO 
market grew considerably, more and more banks entered and  the market share of foreign 
banks especially increased dramatically. Comparable market structure data for bond markets 
is harder to find. As an example, therefore, table 6 lists the top ten bookrunners of Euro-
denominated bonds issued or guaranteed by German entities in 2001. 
 
<Table 6 around here> 
 
A similar picture emerges here. While Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank’s investment 
banking subsidiaries take the lead positions and Commerzbank ranks No. 8 in bond 
underwriting with German issuers, no other German bank is among the top ten underwriters. 
Again US investment banks have gained significant market shares in recent years. In  M&A 
advisory mandates related to Germany a similar picture emerges as only Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank play a role of any importance in these transactions (for the sake of brevity, we 
do not report market share data here). Overall, in investment banking services the following 
picture emerges. Investment banking business – even with German corporate customers – was 
                                                            
62 For more evidence and an in-depth discussion on IPOs in Germany see Franzke et al. (2003). 
 
63 Market fragmentation as a response to market growth is a standard result in IO; see Sutton (1991) for further 
details. 
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heavily invaded by US investment banks during the 1990s. Building on their skill and 
reputation, these banks have recently increased their capacities to a considerable extent all 
over Europe. Apart from large players like Deutsche and Dresdner, whose strategy is 
explicitly orientated towards investment banking, most German banks by comparison have 
difficulty in establishing a significant role for themselves in this market segment. To date 
even the Landesbanks are of minor importance. Although often deemed to be the prototype of 
a universal banking system, a closer look at banks in Germany reveals that there is much more 
separation of business activity among banking institutions. Historically investment banking 
has not been a significant area of business for most German banks. Moreover, many of them 
are doing business in rather narrowly defined local markets. Only a few large banks are supra-
regional in scope or offer true investment banking services. Another peculiarity of the 
German case is that competition is among integrated groups of financial services providers 
rather than among single banking institutions. While these structural peculiarities are quite 
obvious, their influence on market outcomes and economic performance is by no means clear. 
 
Competitiveness in German banking 
 
To assess the competitiveness of a market, the empirical industrial organization (IO) approach 
can be applied as it offers a range of techniques from traditional structure-performance studies 
to the more recently developed new empirical IO methods.
64 In the US questions related to the 
industrial organization of banking have always been of great interest to both academics as 
well as bank regulators. By comparison in Europe there is not yet much empirical evidence on 
the issue, despite the widespread belief that considerable market power is exercised by banks. 
Given the purpose of this section two questions seem to be of importance. Firstly, what can be 
said about the competitiveness of German banking when compared to other countries, most 
importantly its European peers? Secondly, are there any differences in terms of conduct 
between banking groups (co-operative, public, private) within the German financial system? 
 
Courvoisier/Gropp (2002) use the more traditional structure-performance approach toanalyze 
the relationship between bank retail margins and measures of national industry concentration 
for the 1993 to 1999 period. Their study comprising observations from 10 European countries 
finds a statistically and economically significant correlation between margins and product 
specific measures of industry concentration. Given that their estimate of a national German 
Herfindahl index is low and Germany is the least concentrated market in the 
                                                            
64 See Bresnahan (1989) for an overview. 
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Courvoisier/Gropp (2002) data set, a possible interpretation of their results is that Germany is 
one of the most competitive banking markets in Europe and margins in deposit and loan 
markets are low in international comparison
65.  
 
Several empirical studies apply the methodology proposed by Panzar/Rosse (1987) estimating 
reduced form revenue functions and using the sum of estimated factor price elasticities – the 
H-statistic - as an indicator of competitiveness. According to Panzar/Rosse (1987) the H-
statistic is 1 in the case of perfect competition and negative in the case of monopoly behavior, 
intermediate values refer to monopolistic competition. Hempell (2002) uses a large panel data 
set covering almost all banks reporting to the Bundesbank for its monthly banking statistics. 
Like Lang (1997), who uses a subset of German private, co-operative and public savings 
banks, her analysis focuses on the differences between German banking groups and the 
differences over time. Bikker/Groeneveld (1998), De Bandt/Davies (1998) and Molyneux et 
al. (1994) in contrast analyze competition in a cross-section of European countries using Fitch 
IBCA’s data bank. All these studies find intermediate values for the H-statistic for German 
banks, which do not allow for a very precise interpretation of the mode of industry conduct. In 
Hempell (2002) and Lang (1997) and De Bandt/Davies (1998) H-statistics are larger 
(indicating more competitive behavior) for larger banks than for smaller ones and for private 
banks compared to savings banks and credit co-operatives. A possible interpretation is that 
smaller banks, savings banks as well credit co-operatives, exercise market power due to their 
strong competitive position in local retail markets and the type of spatial differentiation that 
comes with it.
66 From those three studies that use cross-country data it is hard to judge how 
Germany compares to other European countries. With only a few exceptions, across Europe 
all estimated H-statistics are between 0 and 1, indicating monopolistic competition; no further 
comment can be made. However, lack of robustness across specifications or time, large 
standard errors and most notably problems in interpreting intermediate values of H render 
pairwise comparisons inconclusive. For example, in Bikker and Groeneveld’s study almost all 
country-specific estimates are well above 0.75 with only a few that are indistinguishable from 
1 (perfect competition). 
 
                                                            
65 We have already noted the large differences in measures of German bank market concentration to be found in 
the literature. 
 
66 However it must be noted that systematic differences in the maturity structure of loans and deposits between 
banking groups might also contribute to this result as they obviously influence measured factor price elasticities. 
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In empirical IO a widely accepted measure of the degree of market power, or alternatively an 
inverse measure of competition, is the Lerner Index L. With P for price, MC for marginal cost 
and  ( ) p h denoting the price elasticity of demand, the Lerner Index computes as 
 
( )
P MC
L p
P
h
-
= . 
 
As an alternative to the Rosse/Panzar methodology, one could as well attempt to measure this 
index more directly. A quick and simplistic method uses accounting data on revenues or price 
data and imposes restrictive assumptions with respect to marginal cost.
67 A more 
sophisticated alternative, however, tries to estimate the Lerner index econometrically from 
structural models of oligopoly behavior based on conjectural variations.
68 There are several 
applications of this methodology in banking markets.
69 Neven/Röller (1999) for example, 
investigate industry conduct in European loan markets and find significant exercise of market 
power in corporate loan and household mortgage markets. Given their estimate of the 
elasticity-adjusted Lerner index close to 1, they cannot reject the hypothesis of collusive 
conduct in Europe. However, their data and technique do not allow for the separate estimation 
of conduct parameters for the countries that comprise their sample and it is thus not possible 
to compare Germany to its European peers.  
 
Angelini/Cetorelli (1999) and Ribon/Yosha (1999) analyze the effect of banking deregulation 
on industry conduct in Italy and Israel respectively. Both studies find significant shifts 
towards more competitive industry conduct throughout the 1990s. Fischer/Hempell (2003) 
employ a methodology quite similar to Angelini/Cetorelli’s (1998) cross-sectional study and 
investigate industry conduct in Germany for the 1994 to 2001 period for a sample which 
includes almost all German banks that report their P&L accounts to the Bundesbank. 
Estimated Lerner indices for implied prices of compound banking services, including both 
interest and non-interest income, are displayed in figure 2 below for all banks in the sample 
and for banks from western Germany separately.
70 
                                                            
67 For examples see Domowitz et al. (1996) for manufacturing industries, or Gual/Neven (1993) using price data 
for European banking. 
 
68 See Bresnahan (1989) for an overview and Genesove/Mullin (1998) for an application that provides evidence 
in favour of the accuracy of the methodology. 
 
69 See, for example, Neven/Röller (1999), Shaffer (1993) for Canada, Spiller/Favero (1984) for Uruguay, 
Ribon/Yosha (1999) for Israel or Angelini/Cetorelli (1999) for Italy. 
 
70 The estimated model consists of a price equation derived from the first-order condition of a profit maximising 
oligopolist in a static conjectural variation equilibrium and a cost function of the translog functional form. The  
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<Figure 2 around here> 
 
The Lerner indices in Figure 2 are not adjusted for the elasticity of demand for the compound 
banking service and thus should be interpreted with some caution.
71 Also, the use of 
accounting data in Fischer/Hempell (2003) raises some specific problems. For example, as 
their measure of price is derived from banks’ fee income and interest income figures, 
unexpected losses due to borrower distress bias the measure of bank market power 
downward.
72 Furthermore, the maturity structure of a loan portfolio might seriously affect this 
measure of price.
73 
 
Taking all these difficulties into account, the Lerner indices reported by Fischer/Hempell 
(2003) seem to be moderate and are well below 0.10 during the sample period. There is a 
marked decline in the Lerner indices both for the full sample of German banks and the 
western German sub-sample, indicating an intensification of competitive rivalry throughout 
the 1990s. Moreover, higher Lerner indices for the sub-sample of banks from the western part 
of the country may be interpreted as preliminary evidence of less market power exercised by 
eastern German banks. 
 
These figures thus do indeed support the notion that German banking has been quite 
competitive during the second half of the 1990s. Whether a similar conclusion could also be 
drawn for the 1970s and 1980s, remains an open question. Obviously, cautioun should be 
exercised in drawing strong conclusions from the few studies that are currently available and 
it is wise to be well aware of the fact that the empirical estimation of market power and 
competitiveness entails many methodological problems. Summing up, however, it can be 
concluded that the existing empirical evidence does not lend much support to the widely held 
notion of significant market power exercised by German banks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cost function includes three factor prices as explanatory variables. The system was estimated with 3SLS 
instrumental variables procedures. See Fischer/Hempell (2003).  
 
71 However, most econometric estimates of, for example the interest rate elasticity of loan demand yield values 
well below 1. See Ribon/Yosha (1999) for one such example. 
 
72 There is little dispute that the frequency of such events has steadily increased during their sample period. 
Furthermore, it must be noted, that as an ex post measure of market power, these Lerner indices could also be 
negative for some sub-periods. 
 
73 See Hempell (2002) for further discussions. 
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2. A closer look - selected issues in German bank regulation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
We first of all review an episode of German financial market regulation – the introduction of 
money market mutual funds in 1994 – in order to throw more light on the role of the 
Bundesbank and of monetary policy considerations. Next we focus on the building blocks of 
modern prudential regulation, i.e capital requirements, the supervisory process and deposit 
insurance. While the first of these issues is now fully harmonized internationally, the other 
two still display important peculiarities in Germany. In particular in supervision and deposit 
insurance, aspects of industry self-regulation still seem to play a noticeable role. 
 
2.2 Money market funds, bank deposits, and the role of the Bundesbank 
 
One of the relationships that seemed to have played an important role in the design of 
financial market regulation in Germany stems from the natural conflict of interest between 
bank regulation and monetary policy. Since World War II and owing to the trauma of two 
hyperinflations, there has been a strong desire on the part of German central bankers to pursue 
their anti-inflationary policy independently not only of political interference but also of the 
short term effects that it might have on financial markets and on real economic activity. 
 
From a very general perspective, every central bank would prefer higher banking industry 
profits to lower ones, simply because higher profits lower the probability of bank failures and 
thus of financial instability.
74 Given that financial stability is an important prerequisite for the 
independent conduct of monetary policy, a central bank might, in one way or another, 
influence matters in favor of incumbent banks’ profitability. The argument that applies to the 
Bundesbank, however, is somewhat more specific and based on the viability of monetary 
targeting on the one hand and a natural conflict of interest between monetary and regulatory 
objectives on the other. This latter point – often overlooked – is made precisely in 
Goodhard/Schoenmaker (1993) who note: ”It is the German tradition which exhibits the 
greatest concern about conflicts of interest, and the greatest desire for separation of 
                                                            
74 See Cukierman (1993) for a discussion. 
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responsibilities; yet it is the German system, dominated by an oligopoly of enormously 
powerful universal banks, with relatively underdeveloped, competitive wholesale financial 
markets, in which such ´conflicts´of interest will be least bothersome”.
75 The Bundesbank has 
always played a significant role in the regulatory process.
76 Besides its involvement in bank 
supervision, the central bank has had a powerful say in almost every discussion about 
financial market reform.
77As an example, the Bundesbank always strongly opposed the 
introduction of securitized money market instruments issued either by the government or by 
private entities. The Bundesbank argued that these instruments would affect the accuracy and 
empirical basis of monetary targeting as well as the effectiveness of reserve requirements as 
an instrument of its monetary policy. Furthermore, the Bundesbank repeatedly maintained that 
such instruments would introduce "short-termism" into the financial sector. In a Monthly 
Report in 1997 this was stated as follows: “If a major part of credit terms is geared to short-
term interest rates, however, the impact of the central bank’s interest rate policy measures on 
the real economy increases, as does the risk of conflicts of interest”.
78 By preventing these 
short-term instruments from being marketed, however, the Bundesbank effectively protected 
the deposit franchise of German banks.  
 
A nice example that further illustrates this point is the struggle for the introduction of money 
market mutual funds at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1988 the state of Lower Saxony 
proposed  changing the law on investment companies and allowing money market mutual 
funds to operate. Until then, the Investment Company Act stipulated that funds were not 
allowed to invest in short term instruments with maturity below one year. From the beginning 
of the discussion on money market funds, the political side, i.e.all political parties at the 
federal as well as at the state level, had a strong preference in favor of the proposed reform. 
The Bundesbank strongly opposed. It is striking that this veto was enough to stop any further 
legislative initiative for a couple of years. As in many previous instances ,  the federal 
government in particular regarded the Bundesbank’s veto as imperative. But in January 1992 
the Ministry of Finance surprisingly launched another attempt to allow market funds to 
                                                            
75 Goodhart/Schoenmaker (1993) provide a nice description of the manifestation of this conflict of interest. 
 
76 See also Franke (2001). 
 
77 According to the German Banking Act, participation of the Bundesbank in the regulatory process is limited 
and, depending on the specific case considered, ranges from its participation in official hearings to the 
requirement that it explicitly agrees to regulatory actions undertaken by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office 
(FBSO). Especially in the legislative process the Bundesbank only acts as an advisor to the Federal Government 
and occasionally expresses its opinion. In reality, however, its influence has always been much stronger and was 
well beyond what could be derived simply from its legal status. 
 
78 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1997). 
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operate in Germany. In its outline for financial market reform, the Ministry explicitly 
proposed changing the law on investment companies accordingly.
79 The Bundesbank 
responded almost immediately and couple of weeks later it declared money market mutual 
funds as “unwelcome” and refused all further attempts to introduce these instruments. The 
Ministry of Finance, in reaction, then withdrew its proposal and stated that it did not intend to 
allow money market mutual funds in the near future. In 1994, however, harmonization 
activities at the European level forced the Bundesbank to change its position. European 
negotiations on the so called OGAW Directive made it clear that national resistance against 
money market funds could no longer be sustained. However, when the Bundesbank’s decision 
to put aside its reservations against money market funds became public, this came as a real 
surprise to the market. Upon announcement of the Bundesbank’s retreat, German banks 
experienced significantly negative stock price reactions. Table 7 displays the authors’ own 
estimates of cumulative abnormal returns for three bank portfolios around the announcement 
date.
80 
 
<Table 7 around here> 
 
CARs in table 7 indicate that the three large banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and 
Commerzbank), which comprise the large bank portfolio (right column of table 7) 
experienced more negative abnormal returns compared to smaller banks. This might be due to 
"cannibalization" effects, since these banks have large investment companies as their 
subsidiaries, who were among the first to offer money market funds to their customers and 
thus created in-house competition for depositors’ funds. An examination of the abnormal 
returns of single banks indicates that negative stock price reactions seem to be related to the 
share of savings deposits in a bank' s financial structure (not shown here).
81 Although only 
based on a sample of thirteen banks whose stock traded on an exchange at that time, these 
results could be seen as an indication of more competitive pricing behavior in bank deposit 
markets following the introduction of money market mutual funds. Some supporting evidence 
                                                            
79 See Bundesfinanzministerium (1992). 
 
80 Unfortunately the announcement of the Bundesbank’s retreat is contaminated by a downward change in the 
discount rate and Lombard rate, which occurred the same day. This contamination however is most likely to lead 
to an upward bias of our estimate of a negative stock price reaction. Kaen et al. (1997) for example show that 
during the 1987 to 1993 period, a downward change in either the discount rate or the Lombard rate in every 
single case led to positive price reactions of banks’ stock. Taking this into account, the actual stock price 
reaction upon announcement of the Bundesbank decision with respect to money market funds might have been 
even more negative than those documented in Table 7. 
 
81 This is interesting because after the introduction of money market funds especially Savings banks and co-
operative banks offered new products in the field of savings deposits, which significantly increased the interest 
paid on these accounts. See also Bundesbank (1997).  
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for this hypothesis can further be found in banks’ pricing behavior following the licensing of 
the first of those funds in August 1994. Bank deposit margins, defined as the difference 
between money market rates and rates on time and savings deposits of equal maturity, 
dropped significantly as shown in figure 3. This figure displays an equally weighted index of 
gross deposit margins comprising different types of savings and time deposit products (the 
line in figure 3). It also shows the number of money market mutual funds that were licensed 
by the FBSO and subsequently offered to the public (the bars in figure 3). It might have been 
the introduction of money market funds that led to a significant decline in bank deposit 
profitability. 
 
<Figure 3 around here> 
 
This story about the introduction of money market mutual funds covers just one episode of 
financial market regulation in Germany.
82 It might nevertheless be seen as comprising two 
important aspects that have been of more general meaning in the past. On the one hand, there 
is the strong role of the Bundesbank and monetary policy considerations which, intentionally 
or otherwise, might have had the effect of protecting banks’ oligopolistic rents. On the other 
hand, there is the indisputable influence of harmonization initiatives at the European level that 
exerted considerable pressure on policymakers in Germany. 
 
2.3 Capital requirements and the supervisory process 
 
Capital requirements 
 
As laid out in section 1.3 above, most amendments to bank capital regulation (Principle I and 
the respective sections of the Banking Act) during the 1990s served to transpose European 
Directives into the domestic legal framework. As these developments are well documented in 
the international literature, and capital requirements can now be seen as the predominant and 
most harmonized of all bank regulations, we will forego further descriptions here. 
Nevertheless several remarks are in order. From a very basic and rather mechanical 
perspective, when a bank’s asset risk is assumed to be exogenous, capital serves as a buffer 
stock against losses resulting from risky assets and thus reduces the risk of bank failure.
83 
Tightening capital standards therefore forces banks to either raise new equity, boost retained 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
83 Capital requirements might as well effectively limit the amount of risk a bank can assume. 
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earnings or alternatively to cut back on investing in those risky assets (corporate loans for 
example). 
 
However, as Rochet (1999) points out, this perspective is too simplistic, as it does not take 
into account that bankers, as a response to mandatory capital requirements, might be induced 
to systematically reallocate their portfolios.
84 In the introduction to this section it was 
mentioned that asset-substitution type risk-shifting incentives are perceived to be an 
especially virulent problem in banking. The high leverage of limited liability banks creates 
incentives to take excessively risky positions. Flat premium deposit insurance that undermines 
deposit market discipline might even accentuate this problem. It is generally perceived that a 
primary objective of bank regulation is to deal with these unwanted incentives of bankers. 
Bank capital regulation not only serves to reduce the risk of bank failure directly, but is also 
aimed at making these incentives less severe. This is why the more indirect effects of capital 
regulation have to be carefully assessed. Whether capital requirements trigger perverse 
incentives in the sense that such reallocations lead banks to invest in even riskier assets, is 
still an open question and theoretical work yields ambiguous results. While some work 
supports the traditional notion that more onerous capital requirements lead banks to reduce 
their risk-taking
85, others argue that capital requirements will do exactly the opposite and 
make banks pursue more risky strategies instead
86. Unfortunately as is often the case in 
contemporary economics, theoretical analysis in this area delicately depends on the details of 
the modeling framework.  
 
Moreover, one further assumption implicit in almost all theoretical models needs to be 
critically assessed: For all the arguments offered in the literature to be applicable, control over 
banks needs to be exercised by residual claimants with limited liability. Moreover, these 
owners have to be actively involved in bank management and have control over bank assets. 
However as Boot (2001) and Schmidt (2002) note, this is not a good description of the 
corporate governance of real world banks in most countries. In Germany, for example, a 
significant share of all banking institutions could be characterized as being manager 
controlled. The exercise of control rights by residual claimants in these institutions is weak at 
best. In some cases, notably in public banks like local savings banks and Landesbanks, a 
residual claimant in the usual sense does not even exist.  
                                                            
84 See Santos (2000) for a survey of the literature. 
 
85 See Furlong/Keeley (1989) and (1990) for example. 
 
86 See for instance Kim/Santomero (1988).  
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As well as co-operative and public banks, even the large private banks operated in the legal 
form of a stock corporation might fall into this category of manager controlled institutions. 
For example, the large private banks display ownership structures that are rather untypical for 
Germany in that they have widely dispersed ownership bases. Restrictions on voting rights 
have been commonplace in the past
87 and a majority of voting rights in the annual meeting is 
exercised by the bank’s own management (via proxy votes) and the management of other 
banks. In cases where some form of concentrated long-term participating interest was evident 
in the past, this was mostly held by other banks or by one of the large insurance companies. 
As a result, bank managers were in a particularly strong position and in the event that outside 
control was exercised, this was by their colleagues rather than by their shareholders. Bank 
managers, however, might have incentives quite different from those of limited liability 
residual claimants.
88 Furthermore, for the risk-shifting problem to be virulent, it is important 
to have residual claimants whose ability to appropriate the gains from risky and successful 
strategies is not restricted in any way. Moreover, their liability needs to be limited in cases 
when the risky strategy turns out to be a disaster. In public banks as well as credit co-
operatives there are no such owners, at least in the usual sense.
89. For public banks, the 
absence of residual claimants is even more obvious. Here, for example, the fundamental 
ownership right of selling off the asset is legally not defined. Given the current state of the 
law of savings banks in most states, a municipality would neither be able to decide to sell the 
local savings bank to some outside investor
90, nor could it force the managers of the savings 
bank to pay out dividends in excess of the limits defined by the respective state’s Savings 
Banks Act. In the fiscal year 2000 only 2-3% of the profits of all savings banks were 
distributed to their guarantors.
91 Furthermore, because of the guarantee and maintenance 
obligation, in the past municipalities and states were fully liable with respect to any losses 
borne by the bank’s creditors. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that because of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
87 See Drukarczyk (1986) for a short description of the case of Deutsche Bank AG in 1975. 
 
88 Except for the case where their labour contracts display high powered incentive schemes. But there is no 
evidence that high powered contracts were in place in the past. 
 
89 For example, in a co-operative bank, except in the case where the bank is liquidated, no member is able to 
participate in increases in the banking firm’s market value. When leaving the co-operative a member can only 
redeem her participation at par. Although many co-operatives pay out dividends, this does not seriously 
contradict our argument. 
 
90 The same holds true for the states and their Landesbanks. However, we have to note here, that as a 
consequence of interventions by the European Commission, most states are currently reforming their savings 
bank law with likely consequences for restrictions on dividend distributions and basic ownership rights. 
 
91 We thank the DSGV for providing this non-public information.  
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negative effects on public budgets and the burden for the taxpayer, distress of savings banks 
or Landesbanks has a non-negligible impact on the re-election of mayors and state 
governments.
92 Furthermore, as already mentioned above from our perspective it is an 
oversimplification to classify Landesbanks as “government owned” institutions as in La Porta 
et al. (2002). Closer examination of ownership structures of Landesbanks shows that on 
average the German states, the regional association of savings banks and other Landesbanks 
all hold around 30% of all ownership rights assigned.
93  
 
During the 1990s, there was a remarkable capital build-up of banks in industrialized countries. 
Jackson et al. (1999) show that in G-10 countries average bank capital ratios increased from 
9.3% to 11.2% during the 1988 to 1996 period. Interestingly, this rise in capital ratios 
coincided with the agreement and implementation of the first Basle Accord. In Germany a 
similar pattern could be observed. Figure 4 below displays capital ratios (ratio of banks’ 
capital to risk assets) for all German banks over the 1977 to 2001 period. Unfortunately data 
for the 1988 to 1993 period is missing but a likely path of the development of capital ratios is 
indicated by the dotted line. Besides regulatory requirements following the first Basle Accord, 
several other explanations for this capital build-up are offered in the literature, market 
discipline being one of them.
94 Closer scrutiny of German data reveals interesting patterns, 
whose interpretations should take into account the specific features of the German banking 
system. Table 8, therefore, contains information about bank capital ratios, growth in total 
assets, loans to non-banks and book equity broken down according to bank group. 
 
 
<Figure 4 around here> 
 
As becomes apparent from table 8, during the 1990s all groups of banks seem to have 
improved their regulatory capital position. However, capital ratios in 1993 as well as in 2001 
were higher for private banks than for public banks. 
 
<Table 8 around here> 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
92 A recent example is the state of Berlin, where the state owned Bankgesellschaft Berlin nearly defaulted, which 
led to considerable cuts in public spending. As one consequence, the former state government was not re-elected. 
 
93 While these institutions themselves are state-owned, conflicts of interest are likely to play a role here. For 
example business relationships between savings banks and Landbanks are very close. 
 
94 Flannery/Rangan (2002) provide evidence in favor of the market discipline hypothesis for US banks. 
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This might be interpreted as support for the widely accepted notion that state and municipal 
guarantees undermine market discipline and provide public banks with a competitive 
advantage. Despite these lower capital ratios, German Landesbanks’ long-term credit rating, 
for example, has been one or two notches above that of their private banking competitors.
95 
According to Sironi (2001), investors’ required return on subordinate debentures issued by 
European public banks is around 40 basis point lower than for otherwise comparable issues by 
private banks.
96 Especially for the larger banks active in the large-volume-low-margin 
wholesale market this turns out to be a remarkable competitive advantage. Interestingly, the 
capital build-up indicated in figure 4 and table 8 is stronger for large banking institutions that 
refinance a larger part of their assets in the capital market. This is also true for the 
Landesbanks and co-operative central banks. By comparison the smaller retail banks 
refinanced more heavily by customer deposits  have lower regulatory capital ratios.  
 
 
Licensing, supervision, and interventions 
 
Besides capital requirements, the second building block of bank regulation as laid down by 
the Banking Act is a supervisory process that accompanies a financial institution’s life from 
the “cradle to the grave”, that is, from licensing to (voluntary or forced) bank closure. 
Conducting banking business or providing financial services without being licensed by the 
FBSO is a punishable offence. Central aspects of the licensing procedure are concerned with 
the applicant’s minimum initial capital, number, qualification and trustworthiness of 
managers and owners. Since 1976 licenses are no longer granted to sole proprietorships, but 
in general restrictions with respect to legal form do not exist. Interestingly, the group-specific 
deposit insurance schemes also have a role to play in the licensing process. The FBSO is  
required by law to consult them whenever a new license is granted. We will discuss the 
structure and role of deposit insurance in Germany further below. Whether the process of 
licensing by the FBSO, i.e. the indisputable degree of discretion left to the authority, has the 
effect of reducing the rate of entry into banking below the level already implied by the 
explicit regulations of the Banking Act themselves, is difficult to analyze. Similarly it is hard 
to analyze whether the licensing procedure is especially tough in Germany compared to other 
                                                            
95 Moody' s financial strength rating that disregards third party guarantees is C for most Landbanks, while it is B 
for four of the five private banks rated by this rating agency. 
 
96 It is important to note here that even private banks might benefit from an implicit guarantee by the 
government. 
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countries.
97 As indicated by figure 5, and given that during the 1995 to 2000 period there were 
roughly 3,000 credit institutions in Germany, entry into and exit out of the banking business 
was moderate at best. The number of new licenses granted by the FBSO was in the range of 
20 to 30 per year. The category of returned licenses as displayed in the figure includes cases 
of failed banks as well as those that were closed for other reasons. It is a well-known fact in 
most countries that failure of banking institutions does not necessarily lead to market exit. In 
most cases  failed institutions will instead be merged or taken over. This type of crisis 
resolution is also predominant in Germany’s public banking as well as co-operative banking 
sector, where such transactions are orchestrated by the regional association of public or co-
operative banks respectively. Especially among co-operative banks a significant share of all 
mergers that take place can be interpreted as rescue transactions.
98 While this strategy of 
failure resolution leads to a reduction in the number of banks, it does not necessarily lead to 
market exit in terms of banking industry capacity (branches, employees, ATMs etc.). 
 
<Figure 5 around here> 
 
Also displayed in figure 5 are the number of moratoria imposed by the FBSO.  
Such strong interventions by supervisors, however, require that the supervisory agency be 
equipped with all the relevant information. No matter how tight the regulatory rules in 
restricting banks and no matter how serious the regulatory authority is in enforcing them, 
information continues to be asymmetrically distributed between supervisors and banks. 
Narrowing this informational gap, therefore, is of considerable importance for the 
effectiveness of bank supervision. The timeliness and accuracy of information largely 
determines whether supervisors are able to detect problems and take appropriate measures. 
For example, the overall costs of a banking crisis to be borne by society are significantly 
determined by the existence of a functioning early warning system. Furthermore, “gambling 
for resurrection” becomes a more serious problem the closer a bank is to default. If regulatory 
information is inaccurate and outdated, “zombie banks” are likely to stay in business and 
pursue excessively risky strategies thereby significantly increasing the cost of a banking 
crisis.
99 On the other hand, maintaining a system of reports, audits and examinations is also a 
costly endeavor. In Germany the system of transferring  information between banks and 
                                                            
97 The Barth et al. (2001) data set on bank regulation has something to say about entry and licensing. However 
despite the impressive amount of information collected there, we would find it hard to make any judgement 
about effective entry restrictions on that basis. 
 
98 See also FSBO (2000). 
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supervisory authorities (FBSO and the Bundesbank) is especially close and presumably 
relatively costly. Unfortunately no estimates of those costs are available. Supervisory 
authorities have far-reaching rights to obtain information and significant obligations to give 
information are imposed on credit institutions. It is remarkable, however, that neither the 
FBSO nor the Bundesbank have built up their own staff for audits and examinations and that 
they rely heavily on external auditors to perform these tasks. It is only recently, since on-site 
examinations of trading activity and internal market risk models have increased in 
importance, that these authorities have built up their own capacities. In the near future, the 
Basle II framework will necessitate further expansion of capacity for on-site examinations. 
 
Credit institutions’ obligations to provide information, either in the form of regular reports or 
upon the occurrence of specific events, are considerable. According to the Bundesbank 
(2000), in 1999, for example, there were 2,254,194 reports on large loans (pursuant to section 
13 and 14 of the German Banking Act), 43,091 announcements of banks because of special 
events (section 24 of the German Banking Act), 213,172 reports in compliance with solvency 
and liquidity regulations (Principles I and II), 46,301 monthly reports on balance sheet items, 
3,401 annual accounts and 2,690 auditors’ reports on these annual accounts. Despite the large 
number of information items submitted to the supervisory agencies, external auditors’ reports 
on the annual accounts remain the centerpiece of the information flow. External auditors have 
to comply with detailed auditing guidelines laid down by the FBSO and are subject to special 
duties according to the Banking Act (Section 29). While private banks are audited by 
independent third party auditors, the regional associations of savings banks as well as those of 
the co-operative banks have their own auditing staff. It is important to point out that for public 
banks as well as co-operative banks auditors commissioned by the FBSO are in most cases 
those of the regional associations of public and co-operative banks respectively.
100 
 
Among all information items available to the supervisory agencies, a distinguishing feature of 
auditor reports on annual accounts of banks is that they provide an assessment of risk, 
whereas most other reports do not. For example, the monthly reports submitted to the 
Bundesbank provide information on the volume of specific balance sheet items, but do not 
allow an assessment of price or credit risk to be made. By their very design instead, these 
reports seem to be much more useful as an empirical basis for monetary analysis. One 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
99 A “zombie bank” is a bank that is already dead from an economic point of view, but still around in the 
marketplace. 
100 This is indeed a very special feature of audits of German banks and might raise doubts on auditors’ 
independence. 
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weakness of auditors’ reports, however, is the low frequency at which they are made available 
by audits of the annual accounts.  
 
Pursuant to section 44 of the Banking Act the FBSO has the right to order special audits 
without specific reason at every credit institution. There is some indication that the relevance 
of these special audits has been increasing throughout the 1990s. Supervisors thus try to 
intensify the flow of information from problem institutions. As figure 6 indicates the number 
of special audits according to section 44 has steadily increased from 1992 to 2000 with a peak 
in 1998. Whereas in 1992 around 6% of all licensed credit institutions were subject to special 
audits in 1992 the share of audited institutions grew to around 15% in 2000 (20% in 1998). 
The largest part of these auditing activities can be attributed to co-operative banks that have 
faced serious difficulties in recent years. 
 
<Figure 6 around here> 
 
 
2.4 Deposit insurance – the private club model 
 
As mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, there might be a certain tendency to allow self-
regulation of the banking industry in Germany. This can be illustrated by looking at the 
private club model of deposit insurance. In order to prevent the German government from 
implementing a publicly managed deposit insurance scheme, after the Herstatt crisis in 1974 
the banking industry agreed to build up group-specific insurance systems.
101 The scheme of 
the private banks was established and is operated by the representative body of private banks, 
the German Bank Association (Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V.). Public savings banks 
and co-operative banks have their own group-specific schemes operated by their regional 
associations.
102 Rather than only protecting non-bank deposits, these schemes are 
safeguarding the viability of the institution as a whole and are thus better described as support 
funds. Given that public banks are completely protected by guarantees and maintenance 
obligations by municipalities and states, a group-specific deposit insurance system can at best 
have subsidiary character and at first glance should not be expected ever to be claimed to pay 
out depositors. Although there is a clear priority of maintenance obligation and guarantee 
obligation (that is obligations of the municipality) over the deposit insurance scheme/support 
fund, these funds do indeed have a role to play. Most municipalities in Germany have large 
                                                            
101 See Beck (2000) for a more detailed evaluation of the system of deposit insurance in Germany. 
 
102 These regional funds, however, are tied together by so called “overflow agreements”.  
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budget deficits and in the event of the failure of a savings bank, when the maintenance (and 
guarantee) obligation is called for,  they must refinance the necessary capital infusion in the 
capital market. This is where the deposit insurance/support fund of the regional association of 
savings banks steps in and often lends to the municipality at subsidized rates. 
 
In what follows, our discussion will deal primarily with the insurance scheme for private 
banks, although some of the arguments apply as well to the co-operative and public banks’ 
schemes. At first glance the most important peculiarity of the German deposit insurance 
system is its private organization. With respect to membership, several points deserve to be 
mentioned. Firstly the FBSO is by law required to consult the deposit insurance schemes 
before granting a banking license. This gives the deposit insurance scheme a quasi-official 
status in the licensing process. Interestingly, in the past there have been a few cases where the 
FBSO granted a license but the private banking association denied membership and insurance 
protection. Secondly, membership in the private banks’ insurance scheme is voluntary but 
mandatory for members of the German Bank Association. Subsidiaries of foreign banks that 
are association members can, however, opt not to participate in the insurance scheme but only 
a few have chosen to do so.
103 In principle the private banks’ deposit insurance scheme could 
thus be used as an entry deterring mechanism, that is de novo banks could simply be denied 
membership and thus be put at a serious disadvantage in competition for depositors funds. In 
fact from the perspective of competition policy the deposit insurance scheme is seen as a 
cartel and thus is under the permanent scrutiny of the German Cartel Authority 
(Bundeskartellamt).
104 Whether admission to the German Banking Association and its deposit 
insurance scheme was used by the incumbents as a means to keep competitors out of the 
market, is not easy to answer. Refusals of membership applications have not occurred very 
frequently in the past and among the 245 member institutions there are 80 subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. One such example, however, has been the case of Mody Bank AG in Hamburg. 
Although licensed by the FBSO, the German Bank Association repeatedly refused this small 
bank membership in its insurance scheme. After a newspaper report in 1995 about unsound 
business practices and mention of the fact that Mody’s deposits were not insured, the bank 
experienced a “run by its depositors” and was subsequently closed by the FBSO. Denials of 
membership applications also occurred in the co-operative banking scheme.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
103 Voluntary scheme membership of foreign bank subsidiaries might thus be seen as an indication that being a 
club member provides banks with certain benefits. 
 
104 For example, every amendment of the deposit insurance scheme’s charter will be examined and needs to be 
approved by the cartel authority. 
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Protection of non-bank deposits is almost complete and amounts up to a limit of 30% of the 
capital of the credit institution in question.
105 Given that there is no retention or co-insurance, 
coverage of the German system is by far the highest in the world.
106 The system is financed 
solely by contributions of member institutions who pay a minimum premium of 0.03% of all 
customer liabilities (sight-, savings- and time deposits as well as savings certificates). In 1997 
risk sensitive insurance premiums were introduced; Member banks are now rated annually 
according to a five notch rating system (A, B, and C1 to C3) and institutions with ratings 
other than A have to pay premia higher than 0.03%.
107 The annual report of the deposit 
insurance fund has to be submitted to the supervisory authorities but unfortunately it is not 
made public. 
 
Apart from the involvement of the German Bank Association in the process of licensing, it is 
also significantly involved in the process of market exit. Again this involvement is 
accomplished through the deposit insurance scheme. In the event that a private bank and 
member of the insurance scheme fails, the insurance scheme pays out depositors of that 
institution and in turn becomes the largest and most important creditor of the failed bank. It 
thus gains control over the failed institution and has to make the decision either to liquidate or 
reorganize. In the case of Schröder, Münchmeyer & Hengst, for example, the deposit 
insurance scheme had to put up roughly € 176 million to pay out depositors and decided to 
split the bank into two parts, one of which was liquidated while the other was sold to a foreign 
bank.
108 
 
According to the EU’s Deposit Guarantee Directive of 1994, every EU member country is 
required to implement a statutory deposit insurance scheme on the basis of public law. It was 
implemented in Germany in 1998 and again used the established organizational structure of 
the relevant banking associations. Thus, even the statutory system is operated under the roof 
                                                            
105 According to the German Banking Act, the minimum capital of a credit institution is € 5mllion , so that every 
single non-bank deposit account is protected up to a limit of € 1,5 million. 
 
106 However, it must be noted that reimbursement of depositors is non-statutory. There is no legally enforceable 
claim of depositors and troubled banks against the deposit insurance fund. The reason for this peculiarity is not 
to introduce uncertainty in order to foster market discipline by depositors, but rather to keep the fund from being 
subject to the regulations of insurance companies. 
 
107 As Beck (2000) reports, this premium can be “doubled or set at zero” depending on the financial condition of 
the insurance fund. Furthermore, there is a one time payment of 0.09% for new members. See Beck (2002) for 
the details. 
 
108 See Beck (2001) for the details. 
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of the respective banking association. Because of their far-reaching characteristic of 
safeguarding the viability of every single institution, public savings banks and co-operative 
banks are exempt from the requirement of establishing a statutory scheme.
109 The new 
statutory scheme covering 90% of deposits up to a maximum amount of € 20.000 takes the 
first hit, while the already existing schemes remain in place and supplement the statutory 
scheme. As a consequence of this implementation, the system of deposit insurance in 
Germany has not changed in any material way. 
 
2.6 Bank competition and SME financing  
 
Given our discussion above, the central issue of whether bank competition might be socially 
beneficial after all, and thus whether "more competition" can be regarded as a valid goal of 
bank (de)regulation, remains to be discussed. Standard economic thought predicts that more 
intense competition will lead to more efficient market outcomes in terms of price and 
quantities. This notion has implicitly underpinned our discussion so far and no specific 
attention was given to the many different market segments and customer groups served by 
(universal) banks. However, in the real world, all these markets are far from being perfect in 
terms of the absence of barriers to entry, the homogeneity of products and services and the 
distribution of information among market participants.
110 Note here that the mere existence of 
banks and other financial intermediaries is generally explained by significant imperfections in 
financial markets. Asymmetries of information, the incompleteness of contracts and non-
contractible liquidity risk, for example, are at the heart of the modern theory of the banking 
firm. As a consequence, this theory itself paves the way for arguments that cast doubt on 
conventional wisdom. In a static sense, therefore, perfectly competitive banking markets 
could yield capital allocations that are dominated by those that result from oligopoly market 
structures in terms of credit availability, growth and stability
111. Furthermore, in a dynamic 
sense, and even if competition were unambiguously socially beneficial, deregulating financial 
services by simply lifting formerly imposed restrictions need not necessarily lead these 
markets to converge towards the competitive benchmark. A more recent strand of the 
economic literature at the interface between finance and IO therefore analyzes bank 
competition in imperfect markets for financial services. In the remainder of this section we 
                                                            
109 Two new systems have been established: one for private banks and one for special purpose public banks that 
are not members of the support fund of the savings banks. 
 
110 To put it differently, what market outcomes should be expected in financial markets when the assumptions 
underlying the fundamental welfare theorems are not met?  See also Laffont (1998) for this problem. 
 
111 See Perrotto/Cetorelli (2000) and Caminal/Matutes (2000) for examples.  
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will focus on SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) and their external financing needs 
and will thus consider only one of the many markets and customer groups to be served by 
banks. From our perspective, there are several reasons why providing loans to SMEs is 
especially well suited to analyzing the effects of bank competition. Informational problems 
that are of great theoretical interest play a significant role in SME financing and might in turn 
have a considerable influence on equilibrium market structures.
112 Furthermore, borrower size 
might be somehow related to bargaining power in loan negotiations.
113 Even small differences 
in bank competitiveness across markets might therefore have a pronounced effect on SME 
financing. Besides, SMEs represent an important part of the German economy in terms of 
investment, value added, employment, and innovative activity.
114  
In a widely cited paper Petersen/Rajan (1995) argue that bank market power positively affects 
bank credit availability especially for young and risky borrowers. Given that informational 
and related incentive problems are a major obstacle to lending to these firms, banks with 
market power could weaken such problems by lending at concessionary rates when problems 
threaten to be severe. It is well-known that in a perfectly competitive market problems of this 
type could lead to credit rationing. In a less than perfectly competitive credit market, however, 
firms with lower credit quality might be able to obtain funding. The argument is based on an 
inter-temporal smoothing effect. In later periods and by virtue of their market power, banks 
are able to extract a larger part of the project surplus from the good customers who survive. In 
the first period, therefore, banks grant loans even to the more risky loan applicants, because 
lender market power is like an implicit equity stake in the firm. 
 
The empirical evidence in Petersen/Rajan (1995) indicates that small US firms located in 
more concentrated banking markets (i) show a stronger reliance on debt financing by financial 
institutions, (ii) take early payment discounts more frequently, and (iii) pay lower loan rates 
when young, and higher loan rates when old compared to similar firms based in more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
112 Guided by the modern theory of the banking firm one might argue that this is exactly why bank loans play 
such an important role empiricallyin SME financing. On the other hand, informational problems might well feed 
back into bank market structures because inter-temporal aspects of business relationships to SMEs might 
constitute serious barriers to entry. 
 
113 Most empirical studies that regress corporate loan rates on a set of explanatory variables reveal that borrower 
size (sales, total assets or loan size) is a statistically and economically significant determinant of loan rate 
margins even if borrower default risk is accounted for. See the evidence in Elsas/Krahnen (1998) or Hanser 
(2001) for Germany and Berger/Udell (1995) or Berlin/Mester (1999) for the US. The fixed cost of granting 
loans could be seen as an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. 
 
114 According to DSGV the 3.3 million SMEs in Germany (sales below € 5 million) account for 50% of gross 
investment, 60% of total assets and even 70% of employment. 
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competitive markets. More recently Zarutskie (2003) finds that small US firms use more bank 
debt and less debt provided by firm insiders in more concentrated markets, confirming 
evidence in Petersen/Rajan (1995). A similar but more differentiated picture is drawn by 
Cetorelli and Gambera’s (2001) study. These authors use cross-country, cross-industry data to 
assess the effects of banking market concentration on growth of non-financial industries. The 
cross-country dimension of their data allows them to measure the impact of more or less 
concentrated banking market structures on the growth of the average industry. The within 
country cross-industry dimension raises the more intriguing question of whether this effect is 
equal across all industries considered.
115 From Cetorelli/Gambera (2001) two results emerge. 
Firstly, the standard argument that market power by banks depresses the growth of loan 
customers cannot be rejected. This is in line with conventional wisdom. Secondly, there are 
some industries that might benefit from a less competitive banking environment as this 
improves the availability of bank loans as a source of external finance. It must, however, be 
noted that the empirical work in Cetorelli/Gambera (2001) or Petersen/Rajan (1995) is not 
fully able to discriminate among different possible hypotheses that link bank market power 
and credit availability. 
 
Are there indications that similar results also apply in Germany? Do small and medium-sized 
enterprises more readily find  access to bank credit in more concentrated banking markets? 
Given the importance of SMEs, banks and bank loan financing in Germany, this seems to be a 
question of considerable interest.  
 
To give a first basic impression, table 9 displays summary statistics from a widely used 
commercial database provided by Verband Creditreform, the largest credit bureau for 
corporate customers in Germany.
116 From this data bank we select all firms that belong to 
manufacturing, construction and mining with balance sheets that are available at least once 
during the 1994 to 1997 period and annual sales below EURO 25 million.
117 We split the 
group of firms into two sub-samples according to whether the firms'  headquarters are located 
in the eastern or western part of Germany. As shown in table 2 above, local banking markets 
in eastern Germany are much more concentrated than their west German counterparts. Thus in 
order not to bias results, a sample split is warranted. In a second step these sub-samples are 
                                                            
115 Cetorelli/Gambera (2001) are especially interested in the cross-industry differences in external financing 
needs of young enterprises. The dependent variable in their regressions is the average (compounded) rate of 
growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country between 1980 and 1990. 
 
116 We thank Verband der Vereine Creditreform e.V. for providing the data. 
 
117 For computing the following variables, we average over years to construct a cross-section data set.  
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split according to our measure of local banking market concentration. For the west German 
sub-sample a threshold level of 0.17 for the local Herfindahl was used, while for the east 
German sub-samples the respective value was 0.28. For every pair of observations, the 
average ratio of bank loans to total assets is higher for firms located in those areas where 
banking is more concentrated. Similarly, the share of firms that use bank loans as a source of 
funding is significantly higher in these markets. Although this evidence is more anecdotal
118, 
it is nevertheless remarkable that it is in such stark contrast to conventional wisdom which 
suggests that bank concentration will lead to higher loan rates and lower loan volume.  
 
< Table 9 around here> 
 
As already mentioned above
119, the relationship between concentration and bank loans as a 
source of SME financing displayed in table 9 could as well be driven by reverse causality. 
According to this, banking markets are more concentrated simply because firms located in 
these markets are more risky and less transparent. Given that the cost of granting loans to 
these firms is higher, only few banks have entered because only few of them could operate 
profitably. Furthermore, these more risky and opaque firms have few alternatives to bank 
loans, when looking for sources of outside finance because banks specialize in lending to 
risky and opaque borrowers. The relationship between concentration and bank loans displayed 
in table 9 might therefore arise as a natural consequence of the uniqueness of bank loan 
financing. This latter point is a centerpiece of the modern theory of the banking firm.
120 
However, while the average quality of borrowers in a market is a determinant of bank market 
structure, banks should be expected to devote considerable resources to distinguishing good 
borrowers from bad ones. If this holds true, differences in average borrower quality between 
high and low-concentration markets should not be sufficient to explain the pattern in table 9. 
Instead, for the reverse causality story to have any meaning, the quality of firm used to build 
the sub-samples in table 9 should be different, with the frequency of “lemons” being higher in 
more concentrated markets. Matching sub-samples of firms of comparable quality could, 
therefore, be one way to check whether the theory in Petersen/Rajan (1995) explains at least 
part of the patterns in table 9. Unfortunately, with only balance sheet data at hand, the risk and 
opaqueness of firms is not easy to assess. As a crude proxy, we use industry classification and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
118 In particular, we have not controlled for any form of sample selectivity! 
 
119 See footnote 51 further above! 
 
120  See Diamond (1984) and (1991). 
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firm size (measured by total assets) to control for firm opaqueness. Overall the results 
displayed in table 9 seem to hold even after controlling for firm size and industry. As an 
example table 10 shows averages of the ratio of bank loans to total assets for all sample firms 
belonging to the construction sector
121 where the sub-sample is split according to firm size 
(measured by total assets). 
 
<Table 10 around here> 
 
The relationship between bank loan financing by SMEs in the construction sector and local 
banking market concentration seems to hold across all size classes. Similar results are 
obtained for manufacturing firms.
122 
 
Although providing only anecdotal evidence, the pattern that shows up in tables 9 and 10 is 
very much in line with the predictions derived from Petersen and Rajan’s theory. Furthermore 
it confirms empirical evidence from the US.
123 Interestingly,  the results seem in general to be 
stronger in eastern Germany where firms are significantly younger and riskier than in the 
western part. In Petersen/Rajan (1994) and (1995)  the share of early payment discounts taken 
by the firm is also used as a measure of credit availability and it is found that this share is 
higher for firms located in more concentrated banking markets. Using a similar variable and 
survey data for small and medium-sized firms in Germany, Fischer (2000) finds a positive 
relationship between local banking concentration and the frequency of early payment by these 
German firms. According to Petersen/Rajan (1995), for example, banks with market power 
are better able to provide liquidity because of their ability to lend at concessionary rates in 
troubled times and extract larger parts of the project surplus during successful periods.  
 
There is, however, a closely connected notion and complementary mechanism that might 
drive these results. It points to the relationship between bank market power and the incentives 
to invest in borrower specific information.
124 If close informational ties between banks and 
borrowers are value enhancing, then market power enables banks to appropriate a larger share 
of that incremental value via higher loan rates, which in turn makes information acquisition 
                                                            
121 According to German industry classification WZ93. 
 
122 Since manufacturing firms are more heterogeneous, we also switched to finer industry classification. 
Unfortunately the number of firms in each size industry cell rapidly becomes insufficient to obtain meaningful 
statistical inferences. 
 
123 See Petersen/Rajan (1995) and Zarutskie (2003). 
 
124  See for example Caminal/Matutes (2002a) and (2002b).  
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and relationship lending more profitable from the bank’s perspective. Fischer (2000) puts this 
hypothesis to the test and finds that in Germany information acquisition by banks is more 
intense in more concentrated markets. In a loan application situation firms located in these 
areas have to disclose more private information to their banks. The study uses data on 
information items transmitted to the lending bank in a loan application situation. Besides 
merely measuring the number of information items, it also distinguishes between what could 
be termed hard and soft information. All regressions control for firm variables, loan variables, 
relationship variables and other variables related to the local market. Bank market 
concentration has a positive effect on the amount of information disclosed to the bank and 
further makes transmission of soft information significantly more likely.
125 
 
The reusability feature of information in turn allows these better informed banks to provide 
liquidity at short notice without incurring any additional costly transfer of information. Firms 
that have experienced a liquidity shock therefore provide an opportunity to conduct a natural 
experiment on the concentration-information relationship. If it were true that banks in more 
concentrated markets systematically acquire more information about their customers and if 
this information is somehow reusable in later periods, these firms should be expected to 
submit less additional information to their lenders whenever they are in need of liquidity at 
short notice. The empirical evidence in Fischer (2000) strongly supports this notion. Overall 
there seem to be benefits and costs of more intense competition among banks. While the 
benefits are well understood, the costs have only recently become the subject of economic 
discussion and have begun to be analyzed. The incentives to acquire information about 
borrowers, thus incurring higher costs within the credit process as a result, might be one such 
source for the likely social benefits of market power of banks. The implications of these 
findings on information acquisition and monitoring intensity, however, go well beyond the 
analysis of the effects of bank competition for small firm finance. Of equal importance are the 
consequences related to bank soundness and loan portfolio risk.
126 Moreover, to date we do 
not have a very good understanding of how monitoring, diversification and other aspects of 
bank credit policy contribute to a loan portfolio’s risk-return profile.
 127 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
125 For details see Fischer (2000). 
 
126 Thus, for example, in an environment with aggregate risk Caminal/Matutes (2002) analyze the effect of bank 
competition on monitoring incentives and the probability of bank failure. 
 
127 See Winton (1999) for a discussion and a model of the interaction between loan monitoring and 
diversification. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
3.1 How should we interpret the past and present? 
 
When German bank regulation was first established in the 1930s and re-established after 
World War II, it faced a banking industry characterized by inherited structural peculiarities in 
both instances. The German banking system was and still is characterized by the existence of 
three strong groups or networks of suppliers of financial services: A host of small retail banks 
was historically tied together within the multi-layer organizations of the co-operative and 
public banking sector. The group of private banks was dominated by a few large universal 
banks. The group character is least strong and least obvious for private banks, but as our 
discussion  of the deposit insurance scheme has suggested, it also shows important features of 
peer control and self-regulation. In general there has been a tendency to allow these groups to 
build their own systems, to monitor each other, and even to organize the bail-out of a failed 
institution within the group, rather than with the assistance of regulatory authorities. In some 
sense, regulators have made use of these banking sub-systems and even delegated quasi-
regulatory responsibilities (e.g. auditing, deposit insurance, bail-out policies) to them.  
 
It is not only that the actual implementation of regulatory activity has somehow adjusted to 
this inherited structure of the banking market. It is also that competition in German banking 
might still be best described as competition primarily among groups of banks. As a further 
consequence of this peculiarity, the larger part of all structural adjustments in the past has 
taken place within these groups rather than by shifting the boundaries dynamically between 
them. This is not only true for structural adjustments related to the banking business itself 
(with respect to products, markets, technology etc.), but it also holds for challenges posed by 
regulation. Despite the fact that the banking industry has faced serious challenges during the 
decades since World War II, market shares and the relative importance of the co-operative, 
public and private banking sectors have thus been remarkably stable over time. Germany` s 
banking associations have become enormously important in coordinating the industry and 
industry’s interactions with regulators. Furthermore, they provide vehicles that perform 
certain tasks characterized by considerable economies of scale. For example, they currently 
play an enormously important role in building internal rating systems that fit into the Basle II 
framework to assess a borrower’s probability of default.
128   
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Since World War II monetary policy by the Bundesbank, i.e. its overall strategy and specific 
form of conduct have also had a role to play. On several occasions, the monetary authority 
undermined financial innovation, involving the introduction of short-term securitized money 
market instruments and derivative instruments in particular, thereby preventing bank charter 
values and preserving the inherited structure.
129 What is even more important is that this 
structural stability has also conserved manager-oriented as well as inter-bank-oriented 
governance structures. High powered, owner-oriented incentive schemes, in turn, did not have 
much of a role to play in the past. The group character and the specific governance structures 
might have contributed more to the stability and soundness of German banking, than any 
market power German banks were suspected to exercise. 
 
In the introduction to this chapter it was noted that many observers considered German 
banking to be stable but not very competitive and further suspected that both these 
characteristics might be somehow interrelated. With respect to the competitive issue, caution 
should be exercised before deriving strong conclusions from anecdotal
130 as well as 
econometric evidence. While there is a strong public perception about the “power of banks” in 
Germany, empirical IO could hardly be interpreted as offering strong supportive evidence. 
Even if the methodological problems of this research are taken into account, German banking, 
at least in recent years,  seems to have been be fairly competitive. International comparisons 
also indicate that German banking is competitive relative to most other European markets. 
Whether this was also the case in earlier times, remains somewhat unclear. Further research 
applying more sophisticated empirical methods is urgently required. However, a prerequisite 
for constructing good models might be a better understanding of the implications of the 
specific structural features of the German banking system. What does it mean to have strong 
public banking sector acting like a large financial conglomerate, displaying features of 
political interference as well as self-regulation? The same question can be raised with respect 
to the stability issue. What are the implications of this banking business structure for future 
developments? 
 
3.2 What the future might bring 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
129 This point is highlighted by Franke (2000). 
 
130 Besides a widely recognized but fairly general public discussion about the “power of banks”, this issue has 
also kept occupied parliamentary committees as well as political parties in Germany for decades.  
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What does all this imply for the future of German and European banking? What are the 
implications of this banking business structure for future developments? One implication 
might be that the most dramatic changes in German banking are to be expected, whenever the 
boundaries between the banking groups shift. One such occasion could be the implosion of a 
banking group, when widespread defaults could not be handled within the group system 
anymore and some outside help would be required. Although it is classified as an extreme 
scenario, taking a look at recent banking crises elsewhere, suggests that events of this type 
should not be ruled out entirely in the future. In the introduction to this chapter we already 
made brief reference to the current notion of a general banking crisis in Germany.
131  
 
While some would argue that this crisis is “systemic” and thus a serious threat to the overall 
economy, others do not expect German banks to be severely hit by a solvency or liquidity 
crisis in the near future.
132 Overall, however, there is little doubt that the German banking 
system is in dire straits, a fact that may be attributed to two main reasons, economic and 
structural.
133 On the economic side, the German economy is performing poorly, even by 
comparison to other continental European countries. Stock markets have plummeted and bank 
profits from trading, underwriting and M&A advisory services, for example, have 
deteriorated. Furthermore, profitability of traditional loan-related business has been seriously 
affected by non-performing loans as well. As a consequence of the poor economic conditions 
in Germany, borrower default rates are at record levels. According to Creditreform, 37,700 
firms defaulted in 2002 (26,600 in western Germany and 11,100 in the east), with a rate of 
growth of 16.4 % compared to the previous year and 41.6 % as compared to 1999.
134 Bad-
loan provisions by German banks have recently increased dramatically. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
131 Even the IMF has recently scrutinized the German banking system within its Financial Stability Assessment 
Program (FSAP). 
 
132 As an example of  this perspective, see Sam Theodore (2003) of Moody’s, who in March 2003 did not expect 
the rating of major German banks to slide below the “mid to low A/Prime-1 range”. 
 
 
133 We again refer to Hackethal’s (2003) contribution to this volume for empirical evidence on the low 
profitability of German banks in recent years. 
 
134 Banks in turn have become much more cautious in their loan granting policies. Survey data from different 
sources seem to indicate that especially small firms had difficulty obtaining credit in 2002. For the first time in 
Germany therefore, there is strong indication that a “credit crunch” might accentuate the economic downturn and 
exert an important pro-cyclical effect. 
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On the structural side, the low earning power of German banks seems to be systematically 
affected by the high level of market fragmentation.
135 As already mentioned, even the largest 
German banks have domestic market shares that are considerably smaller than their 
counterparts in other European countries. However, the fragmented structure of the German 
market is most directly related to the role of the public banking sector. Municipalities and 
states own banks that are allowed to offer a full range of relevant banking services and 
furthermore provide them with guarantees that lower their cost of capital. For many observers, 
this is a major obstacle to private banks’ profitability. It is indeed questionable whether public 
and co-operative banks, classified as non-profit making entities,  have in the past put enough 
emphasis on pricing their products in order to achieve returns that are appropriate for the risks 
that they take.
136 On the other hand, in a world of capital requirements, these institutions have 
always been forced to fully retain earnings in order to strengthen their capital base and be able 
to grow.
137  
 
When this chapter was written in spring of 2003, the German banking crisis was still in a 
somewhat unresolved state. While no serious bank default had occurred to date, the weak 
economic outlook for Germany and the rest of Europe has made us cautious with respect to 
making any premature assessment of the German experience. 
 
With respect to changing industry structures, a less extreme but much more likely scenario 
than a severe crisis, can be seen in the widespread willingness to privatize public banks or de-
mutualize co-operative banks in Germany. Privatization of public banks has not yet taken 
place but has been the subject of intense discussions for quite some time now. What is 
therefore required is a serious evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of having and 
maintaining a public banking sector in a developed country like Germany. An evaluation of 
this kind would also require  public banks’ performance in stimulating and stabilizing 
regional development to be evaluated. This issue is particularly important with respect to 
SMEs and low income households. Given that German SMEs are often seen as the backbone 
of economic activity, this discussion will be of vital importance for the future.  
 
                                                            
135 See section 1.4 of this chapter further above. 
 
136 This might have had the effect of keeping margins down. 
 
137 In section 1.3 of this chapter we noted that general mandatory capital requirements for banks were introduced 
as early as 1934 in Germany. 
  
 
51
In the US as well as in the UK there have been serious discussions in the recent past about 
whether banks need be required to target at least part of their retail business policies towards 
their own community and the SMEs and households located there. The Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977, which was revised in 1995, was intended to encourage US banks 
to meet the credit needs of the low and moderate income neighborhoods in their communities. 
In the UK the Cruickshank report proposed to take measure that improve the access to basic 
banking services by low income individuals and households.
138  
 
Public savings banks in Germany have convincingly argued that such policy measures were 
unnecessary in the past because savings banks, pursuing a public mission and acting in their 
home community’s best interest, provide a stable source of financial services to all groups of 
customers. Their business strategies are especially tailored to cater for private customers and 
SMEs. Basic descriptive statistics are sufficient to show that public banks are especially 
active in financing young and small enterprises as well as households of all income levels. 
From an economic point of view, however,  the relevant question is whether this is merely a 
crowding-out effect due to the competitive advantages provided by government guarantees. 
 
As is well known, in 1998 German private banks initiated proceedings against the system of 
state and municipal guarantees for public banks at the European Commission. Although much 
more fundamental in its significance, the actual complaint was triggered by a transfer of a 
state-owned building and real estate company from the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia to 
WestLB (Westdeutsche Landesbank), thereby strengthening WestLB’s capital base. In 2001 
the Commission required the German government to adopt “appropriate measures” to make 
the whole system of guarantees compatible with state aid rules in the EU treaty. In February 
2002 the European Commission, the German Federal Government and State Governments as 
well as the Association of Savings Banks and Landesbanks reached an agreement to 
restructure the guarantee mechanisms for public banks in Germany. According to this 
agreement the maintenance obligation will be replaced and the guarantee obligation will be 
abolished.
139 This will make financing in international capital markets significantly more 
costly for Landesbanks.
140 As a consequence of this agreement, there is little doubt that 
                                                            
138 See Cruickshank (2000), Executive Summary, p. xxiv 
 
139 Existing liabilities (as of July 18, 2001) will fully be covered by the guarantee obligation 
(Gewährträgerhaftung) until their final date of maturity (grandfathering). The maintenence obligation has to be 
replaced by a “normal commercial owner relationship governed by market economy principles”. The latter 
makes necessary a reform of the Law of Savings Banks in all German states. 
 
140 WestLB was the first Landbank to restructure in response to these new challenges. In September 2002 
WestLB split up into two independent banks that will be associated in a parent-subsidiary relationship. WestLB  
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Landesbanks have come under heavy pressure to cut operating costs and restructure their 
business portfolio. While many Landesbanks were active in wholesale banking in the past, 
without state guarantees this does not seem to be profitable anymore. Many observers thus 
recommend that they tie in with the savings banks in their region to integrate retail business 
activities.
141 However, it seem highly doubtful whether savings banks will be willing to share 
even a small portion of retail business activities with them. 
 
It is not at all clear what all this means for the future of public banking in Germany. Rather 
than an immediate shift in the ownership structures of public-sector banks, privatization of 
public banks will occur gradually over longer periods of time. In general, such conversion of 
legal forms may be seen as a prerequisite for further and intensified M&A activity, which 
might be an important option for the future restructuring of the industry. Especially in the 
retail segment, we expect considerable pressures towards industry consolidation and re-
organization to arise in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
will continue to be an internationally active universal bank, while  NRW will be a development bank with a 
“public mission” 
 
141 Especially the rating agencies recommend such refocus. See Skelly (2002).  
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APPENDIX - Tables and Figures 
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Table 1:   Bank Regulation in Germany- A selective overview 
Year  Event 
1957  Bundesbank Act 
1958  Branching restrictions abolished 
1961  German Banking Act 
1965  Interest rate regulation by FBSO replaces cartel agreements among banks 
1967  Interest rate regulation completely abolished 
1968  German banks and Bundesbank enter into so called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” 
effectively prohibiting foreign banks from underwriting issues of DM-denominated 
bonds by foreign issuers 
1969  Introduction of first group specific deposit insurance schemes 
1974  Default of Bankhaus Herstatt  
  Introduction of Principle Ia that limits open positions in forex and commodities to 
30% of bank capital 
  Establishment of the Liquiditäts-Konsortialbank GmbH 
  Expert group on “Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft“ (fundamental issues of the 
banking industry) 
1976  Second Amendment to the German Banking Act 
·  new rules for large loans to single borrowers 
·  new rules on credit files 
·  FBSO authorised to audit single institutions without specific reason 
·  explicit limits on bank losses that oblige FBSO to close the bank 
1974-1977  Enlargement/adjustment of group-specific deposit insurance schemes for private 
banks, public banks, and co-operative banks respectively 
·  1975 Public savings banks 
·  1976 Private banks 
·  1977 Co-operative banks 
1980  Expansion of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” 
1983  Near collapse of Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer & Hengst 
1985  Third amendment to the German Banking Act 
·  Capital requirements to be met on consolidated basis 
·  New limit for lending to a single borrowing entity 
  Abolition of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” 
  Permission to issue DM-denominated zerobonds 
1986  Permission to issue DM-denominated Certificates of Deposit 
1990  First Financial Market Promotion Act 
1993  Fourth amendment to the Banking Act implementing the EU 
·  Solvency Directive and 
·  Capital Adequacy Directive 
·  Threshold for large loans to be reported to the Bundesbank’s credit register 
raised from € 500,000 to € 1,500,000 
1994  Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
·  Introduction of Money Market Mutual Funds (Amendment to the Investment 
Company Act) 
·  Prohibition of insider trading 
·  Establishment of Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading 
1995  Fifth amendment to the Banking Act implementing new rules on consolidation and 
large credits 
1998  Sixth amendment to the Banking Act implementing EU’s 
·  Investment Services Directive 
·  Capital Adequacy Directive and 
·  Post-BCCI Directive 
1999  FBSO creates division supervising “complex groups” 
2002  Establishment of an integrated financial services supervisor – the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority – integrating the formerly separated supervisory offices for 
banking, insurance and securities trading  
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Table 2:  Measures of local banking market concentration - Herfindahl indices based on 
branching data 
 
Markets 
 
No. of 
local 
markets 
 
Average 
Herfindahl 
1996 
 
Average 
Herfindahl 
1998 
 
Average 
Herfindahl 
2000 
Western Germany 
 
328  0.198  0.200  0.206 
Eastern Germany 
 
112  0.280  0.302  0.325 
among them: 
                       Cities 
(Eastern  and  Western 
Germany) 
 
 
111 
 
0.210 
 
0.214 
 
0.212 
Western Germany 
 
       
Densely populated areas 
 
120  0.200  0.202  0.205 
Urbanized areas 
 
140  0.196  0.197  0.205 
Rural areas 
 
68  0.199  0.202  0.211 
Eastern Germany 
 
       
Densely populated areas 
 
30  0.284  0.298  0.329 
Urbanized areas 
 
47  0.296  0.321  0.338 
Rural areas 
 
35  0.255  0.280  0.306 
Source: Fischer (2001)  
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Table 3:   Bank market structure in largest German cities (# 83) 
   
Mean/Median 
 
Minimum/Maximum 
# of banks that  operate 
branches in a local market  25/20  6/87 
# of savings banks that 
operate branches in a local 
market 
1.3/1  1/7 
# of Landesbanks that operate 
branches in a local market  0.6/0  0/4 
# of cooperative banks that 
operate branches in a local 
market 
6/5  1/19 
# of private banks that operate 
branches in a local market  17/12  4/68 
# of bank branches 
  112/69  26/867 
branches per 1,000 capita 
  0.39/0.39  0.21/0.67 
branches per square kilometer 
  0.64/0.59  0.20/1.86 
Herfindahl (based on branch 
data)  0.21/0.20  0.09/0.41 
Authors’ own calculations based on data from Fischer (2001)  
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Table 4:   Bank market concentration as a determinant of bank interest margins - 
Regression results 
   
Margin Savings 
Deposits 
 
Margin Time 
Deposits 
 
 
Margin 
Discount Loans  
 
 
1YEARGRO 
 
0.08 
 
-0.09 
 
0.53
a 
 
PCINC 
 
-0.10
a 
 
0.03 
 
-0.36
a 
 
POPGRO 
 
0.47 
 
-0.89 
 
6.06
a 
 
UNEMPLOY 
 
-0.95
a 
 
0.04 
 
-2.21
a 
 
RURAL 
 
0.08 
 
0.03
c 
 
0.12
b 
 
HERF 
 
0.15
b 
 
0.09 
 
2.03
a 
 
# Obs./R
2 
 
5873/0.94 
 
5943/0.52 
 
5500/0.20 
Authors’ own calculations based on data from Fischer (2001) 
a Significantly different from zero at 1%  level  
b Significantly different from zero at 5%  level 
c Significantly different from zero at 10%  level 
1YEARGRO: Percentage growth in respective product category of all cooperative and 
savings banks'  headquarters located in the local market. 
PCINC: Average annual per capita income in local market. 
POPGRO: Annual growth in population in local market. 
UNEMPLOY: Average annual rate of unemployment in local market. 
RURAL: Dummy variable indicating rural market. 
HERF: Herfindahl index of local bank concentration based on branching data. 
Pooled-OLS- regressions include a constant, 15 quarterly dummies, and 10 dummies for 
states (coefficients not reported). 
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Table 5:   Market structure in German IPO underwriting (1990 - 2000) - Bookrunners 
 
Year 
 
 
 
IPO volume 
(Euro mio) 
[# of IPOs] 
 
 
Herfindahl – 
bookrunners 
 
# of Banks 
acting as 
lead 
underwriter 
 
CR3 --
Bookrunners 
 
%Share of 
foreign 
banks in 
total volume 
1990  1,545.13 
[34] 
0.32  5  90.05  0 
1991  1,494.84 
[ 19] 
0.30  7  84.81  0 
1992  373.98 
[ 9] 
0.34  4  89.34  0 
1993  475.78 
[11 ] 
0,37  4  94.41  0 
1994  596.73 
[ 15] 
0.28  7  77.44  1.01 
1995  3,583.03 
[ 20] 
0.29  10  89.12  35.64 
1996  9,054.48 
[14 ] 
0.32  9  98.65  33.24 
1997  2,529.75 
[36 ] 
0.13  16  47.07  26.42 
1998  4,098.87 
[79 ] 
0.08  29  38.52  27.09 
1999  12,731.013 
[175 ] 
0.11  46  47.47  50.12 
2000  25,556.29 
[153 ] 
0.17  43  65.12  44.03 
Authors’ own calculations based on data kindly provided by Stefanie Franzke,(Center for 
Financial Studies). In measuring market shares, whenever two or more banks act as 
bookrunner for one single issue, we double counted the volume of that issue. 
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Table 6:   Market structure of Euro-denominated bond underwriting (2001) - 
Bookrunners 
 
Positio
n 
 
Bank 
 
Volume 
in EURO 
mio 
 
# of 
issues 
 
%Share in 
volume 
 
1  Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein 
 
26.552  168  10.45 
2  Deutsche Bank 
 
24.209  113  9.53 
3  JP Morgan 
 
21.617  40  8.51 
4  Merrill Lynch & Co. 
 
21.446  68  8.44 
5  Salomon Smith Barney Int. 
 
16.113  59  6.34 
6  Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
 
16.047  68  6.32 
7  Goldman Sachs & Co. 
 
13.660  53  5.38 
8  Commerzbank Sec. 
 
10.180  92  4.01 
9  Barclays Capital 
 
9.866  74  3.88 
10  UBS Warburg 
 
8.077  27  3.18 
Source: Börsenzeitung based on Capital Data. Calculations of market share excluding own 
issues and based on total volume of top 30 bookrunners 
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Table 7:   Capital market reactions to introduction of Money Market Mutual Funds in 
Germany - Market value of banks 
 
Portfolio 
 
Equally weighted 
bank portfolio 
 
Portfolio of small 
banks 
 
Portfolio of large 
banks 
 
CAR [day0,day+2]
1) in 
% 
 
 
-2.4 
a 
 
-1.2 
a 
 
-3.6 
a 
a Significantly different from zero at 1%  level. 
1) Based on authors’ own analysis; cumulative abnormal return for the three-day period 
[0,+2] upon announcement that the Bundesbank puts aside its reservations against allowing 
money market funds in Germany in April 1994. The estimated market model includes the daily 
return on an equally weighted market index (DAFOX), the daily change in the long-term 
government bond yield and the daily change in the three-month money market rate as 
explanatory variables;stock price data from Deutsche Kapitalmarktdatenbank, Karlsruhe; 
data on interest rates from Deutsche Bundesbank 
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Table 8:   Regulatory capital positions of German banks -results for different banking 
groups 
 
Bank group 
Regulatory 
capital ratio 
1) 
 
%rate of growth 
 
%rate of growth 
 
%rate of growth 
   
1993 
 
2001 
 
 
Total assets 
 
Loans to non-
banks 
 
Book equity 
Large private banks 
  10.2  13.9 
Other private banks  10.3  12.9 
 
}     2.78 
 
 
}      7.49 
 
}    9.86 
Savings banks 
(public) 
 
8.9  10.8  4.62  5.18  6.76 
Co-operative banks 
  8.9  11.1  4.33  4.28  6.84 
Landesbanks (public) 
  9.7  11.3  10.1  7.55  14.31 
Co-operative central 
banks 
 
10.4  14.5  7.84  6.78  9.98 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; %rate of growth is the nominal average annual growth rate 
over the 1993 to 2001 period. 
1) According to the FBSO’s Principle I. The definition of “liable capita”l and a bank’s risk 
assets is largely in line with the first Basle Accord of 1988 and the respective European 
Directive 
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Table 9:   SME financing and banking market concentration 
 
Western German sub-
sample 
 
Firms in local markets 
with low 
concentration of 
banks 
 
Firms in local markets 
with high 
concentration of 
banks 
 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
0.17 
(776) 
 
 
0.22 
(776) 
 
 
3.17 
(0.00) 
 
Share of firms with 
bank loans in capital 
structure 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
0.55 
(776) 
 
 
0.59 
(776) 
 
 
1.49 
(0.14) 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Eastern German 
subsample 
 
Firms in local markets 
with low 
concentration of 
banks 
 
Firms in local markets 
with high 
concentration of 
banks 
 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
0.21 
(626) 
 
 
0.28 
(626) 
 
 
4.70 
(0.00) 
 
Share of firms with 
bank loans in capital 
structure 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
0.70 
(626) 
 
 
0.78 
(626) 
 
 
3.40 
(0.00) 
Authors’ own calculations; Data: Verband der Vereine Creditreform e.V.   
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Table 10:   SME financing and banking market concentration - firms from construction 
sector 
 
Western German sub-
sample 
 
Group of firms 
according to 
total assets 
 
 
Firms in local markets 
with low concentration 
of banks 
 
Firms in local 
markets with high 
concentration of 
banks 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
Largest firms 
 
 
0.20 
(64) 
 
 
0.25 
(62) 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
Firms of 
medium size 
 
 
0.19 
(70) 
 
 
0.21 
(77) 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
Smallest firms
  
 
 
0.11 
(134) 
 
 
0.16
c 
(117) 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Eastern German 
subsample 
   
Firms in local markets 
with low concentration 
of banks 
 
Firms in local 
markets with high 
concentration of 
banks 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
Largest firms
  
 
 
0.18 
(69) 
 
 
0.24
c 
(68) 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
Firms of 
medium size 
 
 
0.19 
(158) 
 
 
0.23 
(127) 
 
Ratio of bank loans to 
total assets 
(# of observations) 
 
 
 
Smallest firms
  
 
 
0.15 
(174) 
 
 
0.22
a 
(160) 
Authors’ own calculations; Data: Verband der Vereine Creditreform e.V.  
a Difference between markets with high and low bank concentration significantly different 
from zero at 1%  level  
c Difference between markets with high and low bank concentration significantly different 
from zero at 10%  level  
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Figure 1 :   Concentration ratios in large Germen cities (# 83) 
Source: Fischer (2001) 
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Figure 2:   Market power in German banking - Lerner indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fischer/Hempell (2003). 
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Figure 3:  Bank deposit margins and Money Market Mutual Funds 
Authors’ own calculations; Data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1993
1994
1995
1996
Year
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
F
u
n
d
s
 
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
F
B
S
O
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2,0
D
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
Bank deposit 
margin 
Number of 
money 
market funds 
licensed  
 
73
 
Figure 4 :   Regulatory capital positions of German banks (1977-2001) 
Regulatory bank capital ratio of all German banks. Figures for 1977 to 1988 adapted from 
Rudolph (1992); figures for 1989 to 1992 not available. Figures for 1993 to 2001 period 
kindly provided by Deutsche Bundesbank 
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Figure 5:  Entry and exit in German banking - licensing by the FBSO 
Source: Federal Banking Supervisory Office – Annual Reports 
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Figure 6:   Frequency of special audits by the FBSO (1992-2000) 
Source: Federal Banking Supervisory Office – Annual Reports 
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